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INTRODUCTION
On May 27, 2015, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a rule defining
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.1 In other words,
the Clean Water Rule, as the EPA and the Corps labeled it, helps determine which
aquatic resources can be protected by the Clean Water Act and which cannot. In
many circles, the immediate reactions were apoplectic. Industry opponents warned
of dire consequences.2 Conservative politicians maligned the Clean Water Rule as,
in Congressman John Boehner’s words, “a raw and tyrannical power grab that will
crush jobs . . . . and places landowners, small businesses, farmers, and manufacturers
on the road to a regulatory and economic hell.”3 The House of Representatives
passed a bill that would set the whole rule aside.4 Dozens of states, along with a wide
variety of industry and advocacy groups, sued to challenge the rule; one set of cases
soon generated a nationwide stay.5 Environmental groups sued as well, on the theory
that the new rule is not protective enough.6 Before the 2016 election, many legal
commentators expected some of the challenges to reach the U.S. Supreme Court,
which helped set the rulemaking in motion with two previous decisions on Clean
Water Act jurisdiction.7 After the election, it seems more likely that the incoming
1

News Release, EPA, Clean Water Rule Protects Streams and Wetlands Critical to
Public
Health,
Communities,
and
Economy
(May
27,
2015),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/clean-water-rule-protects-streams-and-wetlands-criticalpublic-health-communities-and [https://perma.cc/72QU-36WY]. For the actual rule (as it
was later published in the Federal Register), see Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of
the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 (June 29, 2015).
2
See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Clean Water Act, WOTUS, FARM BUREAU,
http://www.fb.org/issues/regulatory-reform/clean-water-act/
[https://perma.cc/B2X9JM2C] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017) (containing materials posted by the American Farm Bureau
Federation); Justin Sykes, New Obama EPA Water Rules Set to Drown Property Rights,
Economic Growth, AM. FOR PROSPERITY (June 16, 2014), http://americansforprosperity.org/
article/new-obama-epa-water-rules-set-to-drown-property-rights-economic-growth
[https://perma.cc/XRG9-QJ2P].
3
Press Release, Speaker Paul Ryan’s Press Office, Speaker Boehner on the Latest EPA
Power Grab (May 27, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-latestepa-power-grab [https://perma.cc/MTS6-P8F8]; see also, Jennifer Yachnin, House
Republican Compares WOTUS to Terrorism, the Plague, GREENWIRE (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/11/23/stories/1060028451 [https://perma.cc/5WP9DYP7].
4
Regulatory Integrity Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 1732, 114th Cong. (2015).
5
Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, HILL (June 30,
2015,
12:02
PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-stateschallenge-obama-water-rule-in-court [https://perma.cc/ZTK9-R6VG].
6
Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Challenges Loopholes in New
EPA Rule Exempting Wetlands and Streams From Clean Water Act Protections (July 22,
2015), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2015/clean-water-act-07-222015.html [https://perma.cc/4W73-FN8C].
7
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 756–57 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N.
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Trump Administration will attempt to withdraw the rule. According to the EPA and
the Corps, the rule itself would not actually change very much; the agencies predict
“an approximate 3 percent increase in assertion of jurisdiction when compared to
2009-2010 field practice.”8 But much of the rhetoric has been apocalyptic.
It would be easy to react to all of this by yawning. Nearly any federal
environmental initiative now provokes a similar reaction. Indeed, just a few months
later, the EPA released another major rule, this one governing greenhouse gas
emissions, and the same doomsday warnings and press releases all trotted out again,
followed nearly immediately by bills and lawsuits.9 We live, it sometimes seems, in
an era when environmental policymaking resembles trench warfare, with zero-sum
legal battles playing out over every major initiative, and with very little apparent
movement. Within academic circles, lamenting these circumstances has become
almost cliché. Accounts of the increasing polarization of environmental politics, and
of gridlock, ossification, and logjams, are common, as are wishful comparisons to
the 1970s, a time when environmental legislation emerged from Congress quickly
and with bipartisan support.10 We have been stuck, it seems, and the contrast
between an ostensibly modest water quality rule and its outraged reception is just
another reminder of the reasons why.
This Article does not dispute the accuracy of that narrative, at least in some
circumstances. But in the arenas governed by the Clean Water Rule, policy actually
never got stuck. It has been evolving in consequential ways. The Clean Water Rule
defines the geographic scope of several regulatory programs, one of which governs
discharges of dredged or fill material into “waters of the United States.”11 That
Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001).
8
U.S. EPA & U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EPA-ARMY
CLEAN WATER RULE 2 (2015). In internal memoranda that then leaked to the public, some
Corps staff members raised concerns that this estimate might be high, and that the new rule
would actually reduce protection of some wetlands. See Amena H. Saiyid, Support
Documents for Water Rule “Flawed”: Corps Memo, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 28, 2015),
http://www.bna.com/support-documents-water-n17179933980/ [https://perma.cc/D7DRGM3C].
9
See Joby Warrick & Steven Mufson, Foes of Clean-Air Rule Plan Multiple Front
Battle, WASH. POST (August 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/opponents-lay-groundwork-for-state-by-state-fight-against-polluton-curbs/2015/08/
03/d3418320-3a26-11e5-8e98-115a3cf7d7ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/XL8F-WCAB].
10
See, e.g., Carol A. Casazza Herman et al., The Breaking The Logjam Project, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2008) (“[P]olitical polarization and a lack of leadership have left
environmental protection in the United States burdened with obsolescent statutes and
regulatory strategies. As a result, the country has failed to deal effectively or decisively with
many pressing old environmental problems as well as newly emerging ones.”); David W.
Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional
Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 50–53 (2014); Sandra Zellmer, Treading
Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323,
2323–40 (2013).
11
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 2016). For an excellent overview of the program, see
ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: WETLAND LAW, POLICY, AND
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program—often referred to as “the 404 program,” after the statutory section that
authorizes it, or as “the wetlands program”—is well known to environmental
lawyers. Every major environmental law casebook covers it,12 and abundant
litigation, including multiple Supreme Court cases, has arisen from it.13 But despite
that familiarity, many environmental lawyers do not realize that the 404 program is
changing, or that the Clean Water Rule reflects—and would, to a very modest extent,
advance—those changes.14
Instead of wetlands, the most important changes involve little streams. Those
little streams15 are now a central focus of regulatory attention after years of falling
largely beyond the reach of Clean Water Act regulation.16 The nature of stream
regulation is also changing, with new permitting mechanisms, guidance documents,
and techniques for rehabilitating streams all continuing to emerge.17 The Clean
Water Rule reflects that shifted emphasis; clarifying jurisdiction over tributaries is
one of its central goals.18 But despite all the kerfuffle surrounding the rule, it
represents just an incremental step in a journey that began years earlier, largely
unnoticed by legal commentators, and has continued through multiple regulatory
decisions and under multiple presidential administrations.19
This Article chronicles that transformation. Part I begins with a brief overview
of the environmental resource at the heart of the controversy, explaining why small
streams are both ecologically important and difficult to protect. Part II then
POLITICS 38–56 (2011).
12
See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND READINGS 380–411 (6th ed. 2012); DANIEL A. FARBER & ANN E. CARLSON,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 702–34 (9th ed. 2014); ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 749–61 (6th
ed. 2009); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1060–87 (2nd ed. 2012);
J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 244–80 (3d ed.
2010).
13
See Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 83 (2016)
(citing a partial list of prominent cases).
14
So long as the rule is stayed, of course, no such advancement can occur.
15
The EPA and scientists often use the phrase “headwater streams,” which the EPA
defines as “the smallest parts of river and stream networks. . . . They are the part of rivers
furthest from the river’s endpoint or confluence with another stream.” Research in Action:
Headwater Streams Studies, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/water-research/headwater-streamsstudies [https://perma.cc/7HR7-T9D9] (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). That isn’t a particularly
precise definition, and in practice, the phrase is often extended to small streams that
discharge directly to a river’s mainstem, or to lakes or the ocean. “Little streams,” though it
sounds less scientific, more accurately describes the range of streams discussed in this
Article.
16
See infra Part II.C.
17
See infra Part II.C.
18
See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058–59 (June 29, 2015) (summarizing the rule, which extends
jurisdiction to all tributary streams and makes wetland protection contingent upon those
wetlands’ proximity to other jurisdictional waterways).
19
See infra part II.C.
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chronicles the evolution of federal stream protection, drawing heavily on a series of
interviews with regulators and others who were involved in that evolution.20 For
many years after the enactment of the Clean Water Act, that protection was largely
nonexistent. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, when wetlands protection emerged
as a cause célèbre, stream protection languished. But over time, a combination of
scientific advances, evolving agency cultures, and legal changes turned attention to
even the smallest of flowing waterways.21 Many environmental lawyers and most
environmental law casebooks still refer to the 404 program as “the wetlands
program,” as though stream protections were inconsequential.22 But that framing is
obsolete. Protecting streams is now at the program’s heart.23
Part III then considers what broader significance that transformation holds for
environmental and administrative law. The still-unfolding history of stream
regulation, like most history, is messy, and this is not a story with a single clear
moral. Indeed, the clearest lessons that emerge from this story are reminders of how
complicated and unpredictable environmental lawmaking can be. Nevertheless,
elements of that history have been intriguingly inconsistent with many of the
recurring narratives of contemporary environmental law. This is decidedly not a
story of stagnation; environmental protection has expanded, dramatically, and is
becoming more sophisticated.24 Nor is it simply a story of heavily politicized
policymaking—though the politics of stream protection are intense—or of captured
agencies. Many changes in protection emanated from relatively conservative regions
of the country, and major developments occurred under Republican presidential
administrations.25 Nor, finally, is it simply a story of zero-sum conflict. While the
scope of regulatory protections has expanded, so too have efforts to increase the
efficiency of regulatory approaches.26
Lest this all sound a bit too rosy, there are caveats. Some changes have been
bitterly contested, and the jury is still out on just how effective some of the new
regulatory approaches will turn out to be.27 The next chapter of the story also will
20

I initially conducted most of these interviews in connection with a research project
focused on the roles of regional offices within the federal government. See Owen, supra note
13. A few of the interviews were specific to this particular research project.
21
See, e.g., J.L. Meyer & J.B. Wallace, Lost Linkages and Lotic Ecology:
Rediscovering Small Streams, in ECOLOGY: ACHIEVEMENT AND CHALLENGE 295, 304
(Malcolm C. Press et al. eds., 2001).
22
See Case, supra note 10; Zellmer, supra note 10; Casazza Herman et al., supra note
10 (All of these casebooks cited there identify the 404 program with wetland protection.).
23
See Rebecca Lave et al., Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation
Banking, 26 ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 287, 287 (2008) (“An informal survey of EPA
regional regulatory staff suggests that in many regions 50 percent or more of the individual
permits issued by the Corps every year are for impacts to streams.”).
24
See infra Section II.C.
25
5See infra Section II.C.
26
See infra notes 323–326 and accompanying text.
27
See, e.g., Margaret A. Palmer & Kelly L. Hondula, Restoration as Mitigation:
Analysis of Stream Mitigation for Coal Mining Impacts in Southern Appalachia, 48 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 10,552, 10,558 (2014).
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unfold under a presidential administration and Congress that have made no secret
about their hostility to environmental regulation. As this Article goes to press, the
implications of that hostility are far from clear. But the story, though not without
troubling elements, still provides a reminder of the importance of alternative, and
fundamentally more optimistic, narratives of modern American environmental law.
In those alternative narratives, the history of environmental law is not just a tale of
increasing gridlock and adversarialism, or of captured agencies and litigious trench
warfare. Instead, it involves incremental, ongoing, and often agency-driven progress
toward turning the sweeping mandates of environmental statutes into real, and
workable, protections. Whether the regulatory history of little streams will continue
to follow that trajectory is now a question that hangs in the balance. But for the
moment, at least, the story of little streams is a story of environmental law continuing
to come of age.
I. THE BIG IMPORTANCE OF LITTLE STREAMS
Imagine, for a moment, that you are flying over the Potomac River, heading
upstream. You begin at the estuary, where freshwater mixes with the brackish waters
of Chesapeake Bay. Here the river is wide, and boats large and small ply its waters.
Further upstream, past Washington, D.C. and above the Great Falls, the river
narrows. With each tributary you pass, the flow diminishes, but for miles, the river
is still deep enough for motorboats and canoes. Eventually you turn and fly
southwest above one of those tributaries. As you move from the piedmont plain into
the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains, the gradient steepens, and pools and
riffles, where fly fishermen cast their lines, replace the longer flatwater reaches of
the river mainstem. But eventually, the tributary stream becomes too small to fish,
and then, farther up, too small to see. The forest canopy closes over it, and the only
visual evidence of a stream is a slight v-shaped valley cutting through the landscape.
If you descend to the ground surface and walk onward and upward, you might
then see a small, perennial stream turn into a series of disconnected pools, where
continuous flow appears primarily during periods of wet weather. This stretch would
be what hydrologists refer to as an intermittent stream (as opposed to a perennial
stream, which flows year-round).28 Farther up, you would walk along tiny channels
that flow only during and immediately after rainstorms or periods of snowmelt—
ephemeral streams, in hydrologic parlance.29 And throughout your journey, you
would cross many other small tributaries, all forming a network across the
landscape, much like the capillaries that convey blood through the far reaches of our
bodies or the twigs and branches that transport sustenance from a tree’s leaves to its
trunk.30
28

U.S. EPA, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS:
A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2–14 (2015) [hereinafter
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS].
29
Id.
30
Importantly, not all small streams are located at the far and uppermost reaches of
watersheds. Some are, but many small streams discharge directly into the mainstems of larger
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But you might not choose to go that far. Rivers, after all, have long been central
to human culture; our stories and songs celebrate the Mississippi and the
Shenandoah, not the tiny streams where those illustrious rivers begin. For years,
scientists also focused much of their attention upon larger waterways.31 But in the
past two decades, that has begun to change. Scientific journals are now filled with
studies of the ecology of small streams, and of the ecological connections between
small tributaries and larger waters downstream.32 Those connections form the
scientific foundation for the legal evolution described by this Article, and this Part
therefore provides a brief synopsis of the emerging literature.
A. The Functions of Little Streams
The importance of small streams stems in part from their sheer abundance.
Headwater streams are, as many studies have noted, “the most abundant streams in
both number and length in a stream network.”33 Statistics on ephemeral and
intermittent streams—which are a subset of the broader category of headwater
streams—reinforce the prevalence of small waterways, particularly in arid areas.34
Beyond sheer abundance, small streams also serve important functions, some of
which are summarized in more detail below.
1. Conveying Water
One the most important functions of little streams is to convey water to larger
waterways. Most of the water in a major river first flows through a small stream.35
And while that may sound like a truism, it has important implications. As tributaries
change, so too will flows through the river’s mainstem.
Those flows will not disappear (unless the changes involve diverting water
away); water will still fall from the sky and proceed downhill, one way or another.
But the water is likely to move through different pathways and at a different pace.36
rivers or, in coastal areas, to the ocean.
31
See K. Bishop et al., Aqua Incognita: The Unknown Headwaters, 22 HYDROLOGIC
PROCESSES 1239 (2008); Thibault Daltry et al., Intermittent Rivers: A Challenge for
Freshwater Ecology, 64 BIOSCIENCE 229 (2014) (“Intermittent rivers are a recent addition
to the field of freshwater ecology.”); Winsor H. Lowe & Gene E. Likens, Moving Headwater
Streams to the Head of the Class, 55 BIOSCIENCE 196 (2005).
32
See generally CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM
WATERS, supra note 28 (compiling and summarizing studies).
33
Tracie-Lynn Nadeau & Mark Cable Rains, Hydrologic Connectivity Between
Headwater Streams and Downstream Waters: How Science Can Inform Policy, 43 J. AM.
WATER WORKS ASS’N 118, 120 (2007).
34
U.S. EPA, THE ECOLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EPHEMERAL
AND INTERMITTENT STREAMS IN THE ARID AND SEMI-ARID AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 5 (2008).
35
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note
28, at 3–5.
36
See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER
POLLUTION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE
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A common consequence of stream filling is flooding, as water that once moved
slowly through a stream’s riffles and pools, or seeped into the stream from the
shallow groundwater table, now speeds over a more impervious urban landscape.37
That consequence can propagate downstream, often in the form of a flood.38
Conversely, paving landscapes and filling streams can reduce river flows in periods
between precipitation events. Because water that would have made its way slowly
through the stream and its adjacent aquifers now has been flushed rapidly through
the system, less remains during the periods when the weather is dry.39 Small tributary
streams therefore act like natural reservoirs; they mitigate the extremes of both flood
and drought.
2. Nutrients, Sediment, Chemistry, and More
Nonscientists are generally accustomed to thinking of rivers and streams as
conveyance systems for water, or, perhaps, as habitat for relatively charismatic
species like sportfish or birds. But rivers and streams are vectors for many other
things: carbon, nutrients, minerals, sediment, warm or cold temperatures, rocks and
fallen trees, and a huge variety of living organisms.40 They exchange those things
not just up- and downstream within the river system, but also with surrounding
wetlands and terrestrial landscapes.41 Collectively, the presence or absence of these
things defines the water quality of the system; to an ecologist—and to the Clean
Water Act—water quality does not just mean an absence of toxic contaminants.42
Little streams play crucial roles within these conveyance systems.43 That is
partly because they provide physically distinctive environments; rich ecosystems
often contain a diversity of habitat types,44 and small streams are structurally,
biologically, and chemically different from larger downstream waterways.
Additionally, water within those streams is, on average, physically closer to the
streambed and to the surrounding landscape. That physical proximity promotes a
UNITED STATES 151–153 (2009) (describing changed flow pathways).
37
See id.
38
See id. at 166–70.
39
See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, Restoring Streams in an Urbanizing
World, 52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 738, 740 (2007).
40
See generally CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS, supra note 28, at 3-1 to
347 (describing these functions).
41
See CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS, supra note 28, at 13 (describing
different types of connectivity).
42
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(19) (West 2016) (defining pollution to include “the man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of
water”); see PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719
(1994) (noting the broad conception of water quality indicated by this definition).
43
See Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 296 (“Headwater streams are tightly linked
with the larger landscape . . . .”).
44
See J. Tews et al., Animal Species Diversity Driven by Habitat
Heterogeneity/Diversity: The Importance of Keystone Structures, 31 J. BIOGEOGRAPHY 79,
79 (2004).

2017]

LITTLE STREAMS AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATIONS

9

wide variety of interactions, many with ripple effects extending throughout the river
system.45
One of the best examples of these phenomena involves nutrient processing. Any
waterway, even in an undeveloped landscape, receives nutrients like phosphorous
and nitrogen from the surrounding landscape.46 Those nutrients form the building
blocks of life within the waterway.47 But excess fertilizer from lawns and
agricultural fields, atmospheric deposition of nitrogen oxides, and wastewater
discharges can all overload aquatic systems with nutrients, fueling toxic algae
blooms, depleting oxygen from the water column, and creating dead zones where
aquatic life cannot survive.48 These problems recur across the country, and their
scale can be massive.49 In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, a dead zone forms each
summer, fed by nutrients discharged from the Mississippi River; it can be larger than
the state of Connecticut.50
These algae blooms and dead zones in downstream waters are directly related
to tributary streams.51 In part, that is because tributaries serve as conduits for
delivering nutrients; just as much of the water in a river system comes from small
tributaries, so too does a large portion of the nutrients.52 But little streams also are
particularly effective at processing, and thus removing, some of the nutrients that
flow off the surrounding terrestrial landscape.53 That is partly because of the sheer
number of small streams in a watershed, and also partly because the shallow depth
of small streams keeps water in closer contact with the substrate, where many of the
organisms that process nutrients live.54 When those streams are straightened, filled,
45

See Jonathan P. Benstead & David S. Leigh, An Expanded Role for River Networks,
5 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 678, 679 (2012) (“[S]mall streams and river ecosystems tend to be
particularly active, from a biogeochemical perspective, because the water they convey has a
great deal of contact with both the benthic substrate and the atmosphere.”).
46
See Richard B. Alexander et al., The Role of Headwater Streams in Downstream
Water Quality, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 41, 43 (2007).
47
Id. at 42.
48
Id.
49
See U.S. EPA, NATIONAL SUMMARY OF STATE INFORMATION (2016),
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/waters10/attains_nation_cy.control#causes [https://perma.cc/X6KA9P9H] (listing nutrients as the third leading cause of impairment in the United States’ rivers
and streams).
50
U.S. EPA, NORTHERN GULF OF MEXICO HYPOXIC ZONE, http://water.epa.gov/type/
watersheds/named/msbasin/zone.cfm [https://perma.cc/EG43-6QQ9].
51
See Richard B. Alexander et al., Dynamic Modeling of Nitrogen Losses in River
Networks Unravels the Coupled Effects of Hydrologic and Biogeochemical Processes, 93
BIOGEOCHEMISTRY 91, 110 (2009) (“[D]elivery of nitrate to downstream waters . . . is
strongly affected by the cumulative removal of nitrate in headwater and higher order
streams. . . .”); see CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS,
supra note 28, at 3-23 to 3-28 (summarizing multiple studies).
52
Alexander et al., supra note 51, at 44.
53
Id. at 46 (“[R]ates of nitrogen uptake . . . . generally decline in a downstream direction
with increases in stream size.”).
54
Id.
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turned into fertilized fields, or replaced with culverts, they lose much of their
capacity to process nutrients, and downstream loading, with all of its attendant
problems, increases.55
Nutrient processing is a particularly important role of little streams, but it is by
no means the only one. Little streams also help process and transform the carbon
that flows through river systems.56 They serve as both sinks and, during flood events,
sources of sediment.57 Fallen branches and trees—which ecologists refer to as large
woody debris58—often accumulate in headwater streams, where they provide shade
and shelter, help dissipate the streams’ energy, and reduce erosion.59 When flood
events wash that debris downstream, it provides important habitat for a variety of
aquatic species.60 And while little streams can convey introduced pollutants into
downstream waterways, they also can retain some of that pollution, keeping it out
of larger river systems. For all of these reasons, little streams play important roles in
defining the chemistry, flow, and structure—what the Clean Water Act refers to as
chemical and physical integrity—of downstream waterways.61
3. Biodiversity
Little streams also play important roles in supporting and conveying living
things. For scientists, this is a somewhat new insight; for many years they tended to
view small streams as areas of marginal biodiversity.62 They had some basis for that
view; fish tend to be present in greater diversity and abundance in larger streams and
rivers.63 But more recent studies have revealed that small streams can be biodiversity
hotspots on their own.64 Large fish may not thrive, but microbes, algae, insects,
crustaceans, and amphibians often do; those species disperse downstream and into

55

See Mary C. Freeman et al., Hydrologic Connectivity and the Contribution of Stream
Headwaters to Ecological Integrity at Regional Scales, 43 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 5,
8–9 (2007).
56
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note
28, at 3-23 (“A large body of literature has demonstrated that headwater streams modify and
export organic carbon that significantly affects ecosystem processes throughout the river
network.”).
57
Id. at 3-13.
58
See, e.g., N.S. Lassettre & G.M. Kondolf, Large Woody Debris in Urban Stream
Channels: Redefining the Problem, 28 RIVER RES. AND APPLICATIONS 1477 (2012).
59
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note
28, at 3-17 to 3-18.
60
Id.
61
33 U.S.C.A § 1251(a) (West 2016) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”).
62
See Daltry et al., supra note 31, at 230 (“Intermittent rivers have long been viewed
as species poor, and dry channels have been viewed as biologically inactive systems.”).
63
See id.
64
See Judy L. Meyer et al., The Contribution of Headwater Streams to Biodiversity in
River Networks, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 86, 86 (2007).
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surrounding terrestrial habitats, providing prey for birds, fish, and a wide variety of
other living things.65
Small streams also sustain species that live primarily within larger waterways.
Some species, like coho salmon, rely on tributary waters as relatively predator-free
nurseries.66 Those tributary streams also can serve as refuges when conditions in
larger waterways are hostile for other reasons, like high temperatures or competition
from invasive species.67 If more tolerable conditions return to the downstream
waters, those refuges then can become source areas for repopulation, allowing a
species to persist where it otherwise might have been extirpated.68
For all of these reasons, there is now a strong consensus in the scientific
literature that protecting the water quality of rivers, lakes, and oceans necessitates
protecting their tributary streams.69 Again, this emphasis is somewhat new; these
connections were not extensively documented in scientific literature twenty or thirty
years ago.70 But interest in small streams has grown dramatically. Perhaps the best
evidence of that change, and of its regulatory significance, is the scientific-basis
document associated with the recent Clean Water Rule.71 That report cites dozens of
studies of stream ecology, many focused on small waterways, and concludes that
“[t]he scientific literature unequivocally demonstrates that streams, individually or
cumulatively, exert a strong influence on the integrity of downstream waters.”72 As
the report notes, the contribution of any individual tributary to downstream water
quality may be quite small.73 But the collective impact of thousands of streams, the
report finds, is enormous.74
B. The Threats, and Their Implications
This Part began with a scenic tour of the Potomac River, but my description left
out something important. It contained little mention of human alteration of the river
system. Yet the Potomac River watershed, like river systems throughout the rest of
the United States and much of the world, has been drastically altered by dams,
65

See id.; Freeman et al., supra note 55, at 9–10.
Meyer et al., supra note 64, at 91–92.
67
See STEPHEN P. PRICE et al., The Ecological Importance of Tributaries and
Confluences, in RIVER CONFLUENCES, TRIBUTARIES, AND THE FLUVIAL NETWORK 209, 212
(Stephen P. Rice et al. eds., 2008).
68
Meyer et al., supra note 64, at 98.
69
See V. Acuña et al., Why Should We Care About Temporary Waterways?, 343 SCI.
1080–81 (2014); Freeman et al., supra note 55, at 6 (“Every important aspect of the river
ecosystem, the river geomorphic system, and the river chemical system begins in headwater
streams.”).
70
See Bishop et al., supra note 31, at 1239–40 (critiquing the relative lack of knowledge
about headwater streams).
71
CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS AND WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS, supra note
28.
72
Id. at ES-2.
73
Id. at ES-5.
74
Id.
66
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pollution, water withdrawals, filling, floodplain development, and other sources of
impact. In this watershed, and many others, some of the heaviest impacts have fallen
upon the smallest streams.75
If we had diverged from the mainstream and tried to follow a tributary through
the Washington, D.C. suburbs, we almost certainly would have found a case study
in poor water quality.76 Indeed, the stream might simply have disappeared into a
series of buried culverts.77 Similarly, if it flowed through an agricultural area, the
stream might have been diverted or converted into an irrigation ditch, filled, or
deprived of its recharge by groundwater pumping.78 Farther southwest, beyond the
boundaries of the Potomac Basin, we might encounter the most dramatic impacts of
all. Hundreds of miles of headwater streams now lie “entombed,” to use one article’s
evocative but accurate phrase, beneath the piles of rubble left over after nearby
mountaintops were removed and relieved of their underlying coal.79 Overlying these
site-specific impacts is a broader threat. Climate change, with its heat, droughts, and
floods, is heightening strains on aquatic ecosystems of all kinds, and little streams
are by no means immune.80
The aggregate scale of these impacts is vast. In part, that is a function of
geographic prevalence; small streams reach into so much of the landscape, they are
particularly likely to get in the way of people’s ambitions.81 And because of their
small size and relative anonymity (and because the public has no claim of legal
ownership of the bed and banks of a nonnavigable stream), they traditionally seemed
easy to divert or fill.82 Indeed, landowners may not even perceive a little stream as a
stream, particularly if it appears on no map; one recent study found that many owners
denied the presence of streams that were readily apparent to scientists.83
75

Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“[S]mall streams . . . are being lost from
the landscape at an alarming rate.”).
76
See generally CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROT., IMPACTS OF IMPERVIOUS COVER ON
AQUATIC SYS. 2 (2003).
77
See Allison H. Roy et al., Urbanization Affects the Extent and Hydrologic
Permanence of Headwater Streams in a Midwestern US Metropolitan Area, 28 J. N. AM.
BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 911, 914 (2009) (describing the disappearance of urban streams).
78
See Jeffrey A. Falke et al., The Role of Groundwater Pumping and Drought in
Shaping Ecological Futures for Stream Fishes in a Dryland River Basin of the Western Great
Plains, USA, 4 ECOHYDROLOGY 682, 692–93 (2011); Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at
302–03.
79
Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 305.
80
See generally JIMÉNEZ CISNEROS ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 229–57
(Zbigniew Kundzewicz ed., 2014) (summarizing impacts on freshwater resources).
81
See Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“Because they are small and numerous,
they have been viewed as unimportant, insignificant or a general nuisance. . . .”).
82
See State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ark. 1980) (“Determining the
navigability of a stream is essentially a matter of deciding if it is public or private property.”).
83
Andrea Armstrong et al., What’s a Stream Without Water? Disproportionality in
Headwater Regions Impacting Water Quality, 50 ENVTL. MGMT. 849, 856 (2012) (“Eighteen
(55%) of the ‘no stream’ parcels had visible surface water flows or channels within the

2017]

LITTLE STREAMS AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATIONS

13

The scale of impacts is also large because small streams tend to be sensitive.84
Unlike rivers, which have the capacity to dilute away some pollution loading, small
streams can be transformed by even a short-term event like a heavy rainstorm.85
Because of that sensitivity, even streams that have not been physically removed are
still often heavily impacted. In urban and suburban settings, for example, poor water
quality is so common in small streams that scientists have coined a shorthand
phrase—urban stream syndrome—to describe it.86
Those widespread impacts underscore the importance of legal protection for
small streams, for protecting important and imperiled resources is one of the core
tasks of environmental law. But the impacts also underscore the associated
challenges; many protective practices have direct costs. Creating stream buffers
within agricultural fields or timber harvest areas, for example, can seem like a zerosum game, as every square foot that goes into the buffer comes out of crop
production.87 Similarly, preserving space for streams means not using that space for
houses, roads, or valley fills.88 Sometimes our perceptions of zero-sum conflict can
be wrong; stream protection can benefit landowners.89 For example, so-called “green
infrastructure,” which processes stormwater runoff without the need for expensive
treatment facilities, has real value, as many urban stormwater managers have
belatedly discovered.90 But we would not have filled, polluted, diverted, dammed,
property boundaries.”). Armstrong and her coauthors also found that “landowners with more
regularly flowing streams were more concerned about stream water quality.” Id. See also
Meyer & Wallace, supra note 21, at 302 (“Society considers [headwater streams] of such
little value that they are ignored.”).
84
See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,552 (“Streams and rivers are among the
most threatened ecosystem types on earth and the most vulnerable are the smallest
tributaries. . . .”).
85
See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U.
COLO. L. REV. 431, 441–43 (2011) (describing stressors, many of them short-term, that affect
small urban watersheds).
86
See Christopher J. Walsh et al., The Urban Stream Syndrome: Current Knowledge
and the Search for a Cure, 24 J. N. AM. BENTHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 706, 706 (2005).
87
See Sarah Taylor Lovell & William C. Sullivan, Environmental benefits of
conservation buffers in the United States: Evidence, promise, and open questions, 112
AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS, & ENV’T 249, 254 (2005) (“The most obvious cost of buffers results
from the lost profit when land is taken out of production and established as a natural area.”);
see, e.g., Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing timber
harvesters’ estimates of the costs of practices designed to protect water quality).
88
See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 186–77
(2009) (describing valley fills—which were 68,841 linear feet in length—associated with
four coal mining projects); CLAUDIA COPELAND, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: BACKGROUND ON
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 4 (2015) (noting mining industry arguments that southern
Appalachian coal mining “would not be economic or feasible if producers were restricted
from using valleys for the disposal of mining overburden.”).
89
See Lovell & Sullivan, supra note 87, at 254 (citing ways that buffers can benefit
landowners).
90
See U.S. EPA, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE (2014);
Margaret A. Palmer et al., Manage Water in a Green Way, 349 SCI. 584, 584 (2015).
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and otherwise impacted so many little streams if protecting them had seemed
convenient.
Beneath these practical considerations lurks a more legal reason why headwater
stream protection can be challenging. Small streams—particularly those with
intermittent or ephemeral flow—defy the boundaries between water and land. And
that boundary region has sometimes been an uncomfortable zone for environmental
law.91 In the United States, at least, protecting the environment is widely accepted
as an appropriate role for the federal government, but legal rhetoric often assigns
responsibility for land use planning to state and local authorities.92 In practice, that
division can become blurry, and within the field of stream and wetlands protection,
lower courts have often acquiesced to federal exercises of jurisdiction over places
that are dry more often than they are wet.93 But twice in the past fifteen years—first
in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S Army Corps of Engineers,94
and then again in Rapanos v. United States95—the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled
its discomfort with federal water quality protections that verge onto land use
regulation.96 The Court has not articulated any clear doctrinal rule giving effect to
its fears, and perhaps it never will; the boundaries between federal and state authority
are much easier for judges to extoll than they are to draw. But the Court’s opinions
do indicate that future federal protection of small streams will confront not just the
practical difficulties of changing longstanding and widespread practices, but also the
blurry-edged shadows of a particular vision of American federalism.97 State or local
protection can escape those shadows, but in many states, meaningful and widespread
protections for streams have not been forthcoming.98

91

See Owen, supra note 85, at 476–80.
See id. (summarizing rhetoric from Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court).
93
See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding
the EPA’s regulatory jurisdiction over a largely dry arroyo).
94
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
95
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
96
Id. at 738 (“The extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would
authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate
land . . . . [T]he Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of Congress’s commerce
power and raises difficult questions about the ultimate scope of that power.”); Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 161 (“Permitting respondents to claim federal
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would also result
in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power over land and water
use.”).
97
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 174.
98
See ENVTL. L. INST., STATE WETLAND PROTECTION: STATUS, TRENDS, AND MODEL
APPROACHES 13 (2008) (mapping state wetlands protection programs, and showing many
states where the only protection comes from federal programs). Many states have also chosen
to affect stream and wetland policy by using their influence within the 404 permitting
process. See also, Owen, supra note 13, at 97–99, 101–05, 115 (describing mechanisms
through which states can do this).
92
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II. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION
At the outset of his plurality opinion in Rapanos, in a passage that
foreshadowed his later discussion of federalism, Justice Scalia decried “the immense
expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water
Act—without any change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential
administrations.”99 In one key sense, his charge was factually correct. Congress has
not amended section 404 since 1977, yet there has been an immense expansion in
the 404 program’s reach over the past six100 presidential administrations. This Part
tells the legal story of that change. It begins with the emergence of modern water
quality law, and with the Corps’s initial reluctance to extend that law beyond the
boundaries of traditionally navigable waterways. In a second key phase of section
404’s implementation history, regulatory practices changed dramatically—but not
for little streams. Wetlands protection emerged as a national issue, and as a mission
that the Corps gradually embraced, but stream protection still played second
fiddle.101 Only during the most recent phase, which began during the late 1990s and
continues through the present day, has stream protection begun its major shift.102
A. Statutory Origins and Regulatory Exemptions
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act, a statute that would quickly
dominate the field of water quality protection in the United States.103 Congress did
not write on a blank slate; state water quality law had begun to emerge decades
earlier, and a series of less forceful federal statutes preceded the 1972 law.104 By
1972, the Corps also had emerged as a player in the legal world of aquatic resource
management.105 Its responsibilities under the Rivers and Harbors Act106 and the
Refuse Act107 gave it some authority over the discharge of materials into traditionally
navigable waterways, and the Corps had begun using that authority to restrain
99

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722.
Justice Scalia wrote his opinion while George W. Bush was still in office.
101
See infra notes 145–174 and accompanying text.
102
Wetlands protections have also continued to evolve, see GARDNER, supra note 11
(summarizing wetlands protection), but that evolution is not the direct focus of this Article.
103
33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq. (West 2016). Congress actually called the 1972 statute
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and it later became
commonly known as the “Clean Water Act.”
104
For detailed accounts of the Clean Water Act’s predecessors and legislative history,
see William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States –
State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 145 (2003);
William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States – State,
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 215 (2003).
105
See Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water Policy
and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 881–86
(1993).
106
33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (West 2016).
107
33 U.S.C.A. § 407 (West 2016).
100
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pollution.108 But the 1972 legislation transformed the field by adding much stronger
teeth to previous laws, setting forth the primary permitting programs through which
water quality protection would be implemented, and defining the responsibilities of
the Corps and the EPA.109
One key component of the 1972 legislation was a regulatory program for
discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States. That program
arises from the interplay of two statutory sections: 301, which prohibits unpermitted
discharges of pollutants; and 404, which allows discharges of dredged or fill material
if the discharging entity obtains, and complies with, a permit.110 Section 301 creates
the prohibition, in other words, and section 404 creates a conditional, permit-based
exception. The Corps and the EPA jointly administer the 404 program, with the
Corps completing the day-to-day work of permit issuance, and with most of that
work taking place at district and field offices across the country.111

108

Id.
See Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/lawsregulations/summary-clean-water-act [https://perma.cc/3D4C-TC4L] (last updated Sept. 8,
2016).
110
33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1344 (West 2016).
111
See Owen, supra note 13, at 80–92.
109
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Table 1: Roles of Federal and State Agencies in Implementing Clean Water Act
Section 404 (a Partial Sampling)112
• Administers day-to-day program,

U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency

U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service
(National Marine
Fisheries Service
for marine or
diadromous species)
State environmental
regulatory agencies

112

including individual and general permit
decisions;
• Conducts or verifies jurisdictional
determinations;
• Develops policy and guidance; and
• Enforces Section 404 provisions.
• Develops and interprets
policy, guidance, and environmental criteria
used in evaluating permit applications;
• Determines scope of geographic
jurisdiction and applicability of exemptions;
• Approves and oversees State and Tribal
assumption;
• Reviews and comments on individual
permit applications;
• Has authority to prohibit, deny, or restrict
the use of any defined area as a disposal site
(Section 404(c));
• Can elevate specific cases (Section
404(q));
• Enforces Section 404 provisions.
• Evaluates impacts on fish and wildlife of
all new Federal projects and Federally
permitted projects, including projects subject
to the requirements of Section 404 (pursuant
to the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act);
• Elevates specific cases or policy issues
pursuant to Section 404(q); and
• Consults on projects that might adversely
impact threatened or endangered species.
• Issue Clean Water Act section 401
certifications, which certify that projects will be
consistent with state water quality standards.

The Corps and the EPA entries on this table are pasted directly from the EPA’s
website, as are the first two bullets for the Fish and Wildlife Service entry. Section 404 Permit
Program, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/ [https://perma.cc/D4
DW-NTTK] (last updated Mar. 3, 2016). I have written the remaining bullets.

18

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

Almost immediately, questions emerged about which waters the new regulatory
program encompassed.113 Congress had prohibited unpermitted discharges of
pollutants into “navigable waters,” a phrase that, in traditional water law usage,
encompassed waterways that were navigable for commercial purposes.114 But
Congress then defined “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States”—a
seemingly more expansive definition.115 The EPA initially took a broad view of that
language, but the Corps disagreed.116 It construed its jurisdiction as extending only
to traditionally navigable—navigable-in-fact, in Clean Water Act jargon—
waterways.117 Smaller streams and isolated wetlands, according to the Corps, fell
outside the program’s scope.118
That narrow view reflected years of agency history and culture. Despite a few
recent forays into the field, the Corps was not really an environmental regulatory
agency—at least, not yet. Its historic purpose had been to promote navigation and to
build waterworks, and it had often done so at great environmental cost.119 Hardly
any biologists worked for the agency, which was staffed primarily with engineers
and run by military officers.120 In an interview, a retired Fish and Wildlife Service
113

See Kalen, supra note 105, at 891–94.
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 2016). To put the point more precisely, Congress
prohibited unpermitted discharges, id., and the definition of discharge encompassed “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12)
(West 2016). For the classic explanation of “navigable waters,” see The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 563 (1870) (“[T]hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce . . . .”).
115
33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(7) (West 2016).
116
See Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, Comment, The Army Corps of Engineers
and Nationwide Permit 26: Wetlands Protection or Swamp Reclamation?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q.
619, 628 (1991) (describing “dramatically different positions”).
117
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115,
12,119 (April 3, 1974) (defining “navigable waters” as “those waters of the United States
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the
past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce”); Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 38 Fed. Reg.
12,217 (May 4, 1973).
118
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 628–29.
119
See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 169–213 (revised ed. 1993).
120
See Telephone Interview with Retired Army Corps Dist. Chief (Sept. 9, 2014). The
former chief described the culture of that era, and subsequent changes, at some length:
114

Back in those Paleozoic days when the Corps had just begun hiring biologists and
oceanographers and environmental scientists, back in the early to mid-70s, things
were hugely different. . . . Initially, the Corps of Engineers didn’t really know
what to do with biologists and environmental scientists. It was a culture dominated
by engineers and military commanders. And the engineers are . . . I guess they’re
not entirely monolithic, but engineers are often non-verbal, linear-type thinkers,
A leads to B leads to C leads to solution, not prone to discussing all the other
ramifications, necessarily, and the other influences and, well, how does this affect
what we did on that project, and vice versa. . . . We sort of developed our own
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(FWS) staff member described the resulting mentality: “They were old school Corps
of Engineers, damn the torpedoes, we’re going to issue permits. We can’t let these
lowly fish stand in our way . . . . [I]t was almost like the developers were their clients
and their duty was to issue permits, and they just steamrolled them.”121 Regulating
discharges that might impede navigation fit with the agency’s traditional purpose
and expertise, particularly if, by occupying that role, the agency could keep the EPA
from assuming exclusive authority within part of the Corps’s traditional domain.122
But protecting small streams and wetlands did not.
The Corps’s narrow conception of its Clean Water Act jurisdiction turned out
to be short-lived. A federal court decision compelled a more expansive
understanding,123 and in 1975, the Corps issued interim regulations defining its
jurisdiction more broadly.124 It did so grudgingly. In a press release describing the
new regulations, the Corps critiqued what it had just done in terms just a few
adjectives short of those used by Speaker Boehner and other modern-day critics.125
And at least some Corps staff doubted the longevity of the new rules. According to
one article, a consultant helping with the new regulations was told he should not

culture by necessity, since we were initially sort of sequestered and ignored. It
took me three years with the Corps before I got my very first promotion,
something that’s completely unheard of now. And we were literally told, at one
point, biologists and oceanographers were a dime a dozen. This was by our
personnel director. We weren’t exactly made to feel at home. So compared to that,
the situation has changed radically.
Id.
121

Telephone Interview with Retired FWS Staff Member (Aug. 26, 2014). A longtime
EPA staff member put the point a bit more gently:
The issues that we were speaking to, and still speak to in terms of why a particular
filling activity might have an ecological impact, weren’t . . . again, not speaking
negatively, but weren’t within the wheelhouse of the engineers that were issuing
permits at the time, years ago at the Corps. In terms of, they didn’t have the
academic background and the understanding, and to some degree, attachment for
that . . . contemplating those sorts of issues.
Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sep. 4, 2014).
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116 at 624 (repeatedly discussing, and critiquing,
the Corps’s culture).
123
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D. D.C. 1975)
(ordering the 1974 regulations revoked and rescinded).
124
Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320
(July 15, 1975).
125
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 629 (“Simultaneously, however, the Corps
issued a press release asserting that the decision would force it to require permits for ‘the
rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation
ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to protect his land against stream
erosion.’”).
122
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work too hard, because Congress would soon make the whole problem go away.126
But Congress did no such thing. Its 1977 Clean Water Act amendments retained a
broad definition of Clean Water Act jurisdiction, and that statutory language remains
governing law today.127
But even if the courts and Congress had rejected the Corps’s narrow conception
of its jurisdiction, that rejection did not put an end to the geographically narrow
scope of protections. In 1975 interim regulations, and again in 1977 final
regulations, the Corps drew a sharp distinction between waters that might be
jurisdictional and waters where impacts would actually be meaningfully
regulated.128 Those regulations defined the waters of the United States to include
“the entire length of rivers and streams.”129 But the Corps also established a cutoff
point beyond which no additional permitting process would be required, and
waterways could simply be filled, even though the waters might be jurisdictional.130
For streams, that cutoff point occurred where the waterway had an annual average
flow of less than five cubic feet per second.131 And to accommodate activities in arid
areas, where infrequent but heavy flows might raise the averages, the Corps’s staff
could use the point at which median flows reached five cubic feet per second as the
regulatory cutoff, meaning that all but the largest perennial streams in arid regions
would fall outside the reach of most regulatory constraints.132 The Corps did
establish standardized general permits133—some of which would eventually
126

Id. at 632.
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); see Kalen,
supra note 105, at 897–905.
128
Regulatory Programs of the Army Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 31,729
(July 19, 1977) (“We emphasize that, the ‘headwaters’ concept used in this new regulation
is the point on the stream above which individual or general permits ordinarily will not be
required. It is not to be construed as the point beyond which a stream ceases to be a water of
the United States. . . .”).
129
Id. at 31,129.
130
Id. The regulations stated, in key part:
127

We have responded to these concerns and criticisms by: (1) Including the entire
length of rivers and streams in our definition of waters of the United States; (2)
utilizing the “headwaters” ‘concept to establish the point on the stream below
which an individual or general permit will be required to discharge dredged or fill
material; (discharges above headwaters are being permitted through the issuance
today of a nationwide permit which is discussed in greater detail below); and (3)
redefining the term “headwaters.”
Id.
131

Id.
See id. (“This approach more realistically represents normal base flows of such
streams.”).
133
A general permit, in the parlance of environmental law, is a permit that provides
blanket authorization to a particular class of activities, so long as permit holders comply with
a standardized set of permit conditions. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,
132
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coalesce into something known as Nationwide Permit 26—providing some legal
cover for these fills, but the permits established only limited and largely hortatory
requirements, and did not even include reporting obligations.134 Consequently, in
some districts, any stream that a Corps field scientist could jump across—that was a
shorthand field test for the regulatory boundary—could be filled at will.135
In part because the Corps did not establish reporting requirements, it is difficult
to know just how many streams were filled under this blanket authorization.136 But
any realistic estimate would be large. As subsequent studies have revealed, little
streams make up most of our river and stream miles.137 They also tend to get in the
way of people’s activities, and they are fairly easy to fill. And we know from later
studies that a wide variety of human activities tend to obliterate small streams.138 In
all likelihood, much of that obliteration happened in full compliance with the 1977
1380–82 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A recent Corps/EPA study summarizes its different permit types
as follows:
Individual Permit: issued after a case-specific evaluation and a determination that the
proposed activity is not contrary to the public interest
• Standard Permit: permit that authorizes a specific activity after issuing a public
notice to solicit comments and conducting a public interest review and other required
analyses.
• Letter of Permission: permit issued after conducting an abbreviated processing
procedure, including coordination with federal and state agencies, and making a
public interest determination.
General Permits: authorize activities that are similar in nature and cause only minimal
individual and cumulative adverse environmental impacts
• Nationwide Permit: general permit issued by Corps Headquarters, to authorize
activities across the country
• Regional General Permit: general permit issued by a District Engineer to
authorize categories of activities within a specific geographic area
• Programmatic General Permit: general permit issued by a District Engineer to
authorize categories of activities regulated by another agency, to reduce duplication.
INST. FOR WATER RES., THE MITIGATION RULE RETROSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF THE 2008
REGULATIONS GOVERNING COMPENSATORY MITIGATION FOR LOSSES OF AQUATIC
RESOURCES 18 (2015).
134
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 632.
135
Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sep. 19, 2014) (“Their test for five
[cubic feet per second of flow] was whether they could jump over it or not. We never even
got into ephemeral or intermittent.”). Other districts used the drainage area of the stream to
calculate average annual flows. See 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37129 (July 19, 1977) (describing
this method). But while the process may have been more rigorous, the implications of the
cutoff point were the same.
136
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 637–40 (discussing the lack of reporting
requirements and the resulting information deficits).
137
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
138
See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
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rule and its descendants—and with Nationwide Permit 26 and its predecessors—and
it probably occurred on a massive scale.
This vignette also sheds some interesting light on current debates over
jurisdiction. In his Rapanos opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Corps and the EPA
for allegedly excessive overzealous assertions of jurisdiction, implying that a
creeping jurisdictional expansion was the key mechanism through which the
agencies had accomplished their alleged regulatory overreach.139 The present
debates over the Clean Water Rule reflect the same emphasis; the battle over
jurisdiction, one would think, is where all the stakes lie.140 But the reality is quite
different. Jurisdiction was already extensive four decades ago.141 What has changed
most, and what matters just as much as the jurisdictional boundary itself, is what
agencies do within their jurisdiction. And for little streams, in the initial years of
Clean Water Act implementation, the Corps did not do much.
That may sound scandalous. But the Corps’s minimalist approach reflected a
more general reality of environmental law in the 1970s and 1980s. Those may have
been the glory days of American environmental legislation, but implementing those
laws was another matter. To meaningfully protect small streams, or to fulfill many
of the other grand mandates of the 1970s statutes, would require applying regulatory
constraints to a huge variety of actions, each of which might seem to contribute to
larger environmental problems only in very incremental ways.142 And the
professional infrastructure for implementing that kind of constraint was only
beginning to exist. Environmental regulatory agencies with real authority were
relatively new phenomena. Environmental lawyers were taking a shared crash
course in a new area of law. And the environmental consulting industry, which
eventually would help regulated industries comply with all their new mandates, was
just beginning to emerge.143 More broadly, the nation as a whole was slowly, and
painfully, coming to grips with the reality that environmental protection might not
just mean imposing constraints on a few big polluters.144 If the Corps struggled, in
139

See supra notes 75–86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jeremy P. Jacobs & Annie Snyder, Mr. Clean Water Act Faces his Biggest
Test,
GREENWIRE
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://www.eenews.net/gw/2015/09/30
[https://perma.cc/MZ44-SXHF ] (quoting a Department of Justice lawyer who characterized
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985), a case that empowered comparatively broad assertions of jurisdiction, as “really the
peak of environmental law under the Clean Water Act. . . . Frankly, it’s been downhill
since”).
141
See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.
142
See David Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More than
Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 240–41 (2014) (describing the importance of
small sources to air quality regulation); Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of
Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2012) [hereinafter Owen, Critical
Habitat] (noting the pervasiveness of these challenges).
143
See Bernard Sinclair-Desgagne, The Environmental Goods and Services Industry, 2
INT’L REV. OF ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 69, 72 (2008) (describing historical development
of the environmental goods and services industry).
144
See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1370–71, 1381–82
140
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that historical moment, to become a regulatory champion for little streams, it should
not be too hard to understand why.
B. The Wetlands Era
Small streams were not the only landscape features that received little
protection during the early years of the 404 program. Small wetlands also played
second fiddle.145 By the early 1990s, however, wetland protection had emerged as
one of environmental law’s highest-profile issues.146 With that emergence, the
histories of wetland and stream protection began a dramatic, if temporary,
divergence.
In part, the changes came from the top. President Ronald Reagan’s hostility to
environmental regulation was widely publicized—and, according to some
commentators, well received by the Corps.147 But by 1988, presidential candidates
were openly declaring their commitment to avoiding further wetland loss.148 George
H.W. Bush’s commitment to a national “no net loss” policy has guided agency
policy ever since.
In the field, changes were occurring as well. To implement its new regulatory
responsibilities, the Corps had begun hiring biologists.149 While the new staff
members were marginalized at first, they gradually began to integrate into, and help
transform, the agency’s culture.150 The Corps’s partner agencies—the FWS, the
National Marine Fisheries Service, and state wetland regulators, in addition to the
EPA—also were engaged in constant discussions with the Corps staff, and often
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (compelling a reluctant EPA to regulate stormwater discharges and other
dispersed sources of water pollution); Adelman, supra note 142, at 258–60 (describing
backlashes against federal air pollution controls).
145
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 644 (focusing on impacts to vernal pools).
146
See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the
States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1243 (1995) (“Wetlands regulation may be the most
controversial issue in environmental law.”).
147
See Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 659.
148
See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29–35 (2011) (describing
the “no net loss” policy’s history).
149
See Telephone Interview with Army Corps Regulatory Dist. Chief (Aug. 25, 2014)
(describing the transition, at his district office, from a small staff of technicians: “That has
grown into a totally professional staff, biologists, engineers, environmental scientists of all
different backgrounds. We’ve gone from 5 people to 32 so there’s organizationally there’s
been a big change. And, like I said, I would venture to say that was pretty consistent
nationally.”).
150
See Telephone Interview with EPA Staff Member (Sept. 4, 2014) (“When biologists
came on board, and we all grew from the perspective of staff credentials and knowledge,
everyone seemed to have a better understanding and appreciation of why some of the things
that filling and disturbing streams and wetlands . . . why that concerns us, and it was easier
to collaborate because we had more common understanding of those issues.”).
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pushed for more thorough and aggressive wetland protections.151 The resulting
changes were fitful. Throughout much of the 1980s, those partner agencies reported
persistent frustrations with the Corps’s indifference toward environmental
protection.152 Even as late as the early 1990s, the Corps was still issuing pamphlets
showing cartoons of smiling bulldozers filling wetlands.153 But change did come. As
one former FWS staff member summarized the transition:
a new regime came into [the Corps district he worked with] and they were
just so much more personable, so much more sensitive to environmental
issues. I mean I truly felt that the . . . district regulatory folks and even the
project planning folks to a large extent, really believed in the equal
consideration for fish and wildlife that the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act[154] called for. There were times when I felt like . . . my environmental
arguments . . . may have been even a little heavier weight on the scale than
the law calls for.155
In addition to its culture, the Corps’s regulatory toolbox also evolved. Initially,
the Corps’s reluctance to protect dispersed resources like wetlands and streams
151

Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15,
20–23 (2009) (describing efforts by the Fish and Wildlife Service and the EPA to make the
Corps’s practices more protective); See id. (“[W]e evolved from arguing with each other over
whether salt marshes and tidal wetlands were important to a point in today’s world where
there’s no disagreement among the Corps, EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service, all the players
about those sorts of things. The early days of this program involved a lot of education.”).
152
See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 21 (quoting an EPA staff member: “The
Corps regularly ignores a determination of significant degradation for individual and
cumulative effects. This is the major cause of continuing wetland losses.”).
153
Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 663.
154
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 661–666c (West 2016). The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
requires federal agencies that are authorizing or carrying out alterations of water bodies to
coordinate with agencies responsible for wildlife in those waterways. Id. § 662(a).
155
Telephone Interview with Retired Fish and Wildlife Serv. Staff Member (Aug. 26,
2014). He also noted that he viewed the Corps district he worked with as distinctive. Id. But
many longtime Corps staff members from different districts described similar changes. For
example:
[W]hen I started, the principal . . . responsibility of our program was really to look
at navigation, to look at the impacts of construction activities on navigation. It
wasn’t until the mid-seventies with the advent of the Clean Water Act and new
regulations that came out in response to that, where we got heavily involved in
environmental concerns. And now navigation only plays a very small part of what
we evaluate. It’s primarily now an environmental program. So there’s been a big
change in the culture over the years in the focus of the Corps.
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Aug. 25, 2014).
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stemmed partly from manpower concerns.156 The Corps simply did not have the
staff, it argued, to keep track of so many little aquatic features.157 But the agency
gradually found better ways to provide protection while managing the manpower
strains inherent in governing numerous, widely dispersed resources. Increasingly, it
issued general permits—like Nationwide Permit 26—that provided blanket
authorization for certain classes of activities, so long as the permittees complied with
specific conditions and best management practices.158 And some of those conditions
and best management practices generated real and meaningful environmental
protection.159 By streamlining permitting for more minor activities, general permits
also allowed the regulatory program’s staff—which had grown since the 1970s—to
focus on more significant activities.160
In addition to developing new permitting approaches for wetland fills, the
Corps also turned to new ways to compensate for the resulting impacts. During the
1980s and 1990s, the Corps increasingly required permit recipients to provide
compensatory mitigation for wetland impacts.161 Compensatory mitigation meant
creating new wetlands, or restoring, enhancing, or preserving existing ones, to offset
the impacts of permitted wetland fills.162 Sometimes the permit recipient itself would
provide the compensation. The Corps also allowed permit recipients to pay impact
fees into third party funds, which would then be used to pay for wetland protection,
or to private businesses that had already created, restored, or enhanced wetlands
somewhere else, and now had wetland credits to sell.163 By the early 2000s, the
former approach, known as an “in-lieu fee program,” and the latter, known as
“mitigation banking,” were both available in many parts of the country.164 By most
accounts, compensatory mitigation was initially a debacle; far too often the restored
or created wetlands turned out to be poor substitutes for the natural wetlands that
had been destroyed.165 But the Corps, the EPA, and their regulatory and private
156

Addison & Burns, supra note 116, at 655.
See id.
158
Id.; see also Owen, supra note 13, at 97–99 (describing the development of general
permits).
159
See Owen, supra note 13, at 98–99 (describing the use of general permits to increase
stringency).
160
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 3, 2014) (“If we
don’t necessarily have to look at every small project . . . that allows my project managers to
really focus on those projects that might have more than a minimal environmental effect.”).
161
See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18.
162
See id. at 23–24.
163
See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,594–95 (Apr. 10, 2008) (explaining different approaches to compensatory mitigation).
164
See ENVTL. L. INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE MITIGATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 17–18 (2006) (listing programs by state); JESSICA WILKINSON & JARED
THOMPSON, 2005 STATUS REPORT ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
2 (2006).
165
See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 45 (2001) (finding
pervasive inadequacies); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE
157
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partners were gradually learning from their mistakes. Though the empirical record
is far from thorough, some more recent studies suggest—and agency staff
emphatically asserted—that wetlands mitigation has improved.166
The changes that began in the eighties and nineties, in short, were substantial.167
But they were also focused primarily on wetlands.168 For decades, Nationwide
Permit 26 remained the primary nationwide permit for stream impacts, and it
addressed the smallest of those streams largely by excluding them from regulatory
protection.169 Compensatory mitigation was also focused on wetlands; the streams
AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT
OCCURRING 26 (2005) (critiquing the Corps’s governance

COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS
of mitigation). In my interviews,
Corps staff never denied that early mitigation practices had been poor. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014) (“[T]here’s an old school, I was
trained that way so I understand it, you know it’s just a reluctance to lay a lot of heavy
mitigation.”); Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Nov. 20, 2014) (“[W]hen
we first started doing wetland mitigation, it was on-site, one-to-one, and for the most part
failing miserably.”).
166
See, e.g., Tammy Hill et al., Compensatory Stream and Wetland Mitigation in North
Carolina: An Evaluation of Regulatory Success, 51 ENVTL. MGMT. 1077, 1089 (2013). One
agency biologist summarized the change:
As we’ve learned more about wetlands, their functions, the program has morphed
over time, gotten more prescriptive. We’ve learned what doesn’t work versus
those that do. There’s a lot of things that we didn’t require ten, twenty years ago
that we do today. The level of detail, types of things that work for mitigation
versus those that don’t. Back in the day somebody may have said, “Well I’m just
gonna go create some wetlands” and we’d say “OK, here’s your permit” without
any level of detail of what you’re gonna do and how you’re gonna do it, what your
success is. If it didn’t work, then, “ok, well no big deal.” Today it’s a much tighter
mindset. The level of detail is significantly higher. The way that we interpret the
law . . . and what levels of information we need today are much tighter, and we
don’t let things go or just kind of write them off because they’re not that important.
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Branch Chief (Sept. 5, 2014).
167
See generally Hough & Robertson, supra note 151 (chronicling these changes).
168
One district chief summarized that evolution:
[B]ack in the 80’s . . . most of our work at that time was on the rivers. It wasn’t
until ‘88 I think, President Bush, the first Bush, said, “no net loss.” The program
started evolving towards wetlands at that point. And then the first lawsuit for coal
was in ‘98, Robertson versus Bragg. . . . And that was about stream impacts, and
really the program wasn’t positioned very well at that time to deal with stream
impacts. We didn’t have stream assessment methodologies. There was nothing in
place other than some rough ratio, 1:1 replacement, that kind of thing, because the
whole program was geared to wetlands. . . .
Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014).
169
See supra notes 134–138 and accompanying text.
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that were lost, as one retired Corps district chief explained to me, “were just lost.”170
Even when the Corps did require compensatory mitigation for stream impacts, it
generally let wetland restoration serve as compensation.171 It did so in part because
regulators lacked clear ideas about how stream mitigation would even be done;
scientific research on the subject was minimal, and permits and regulatory guidance
documents were often ambiguous, or just silent, about streams.172 In policy
discussions, the rhetorical emphasis on wetlands was even more pronounced.
Politicians simply did not talk about a “no net loss” policy for streams, and
environmental lawyers came to think of the 404 program as a wetlands program.173
Indeed, that framing lingers today. Environmental law articles (including several
that I have written), treatises, and casebooks still routinely identify section 404
solely with wetlands protection, as though regulatory protection of streams simply
did not exist.174
C. The Emergence of Stream Protection
One might expect the story to end there. Just two years after George H.W.
Bush’s “no net loss pledge,” Congress enacted the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments175 and the Oil Pollution Act,176 but little additional legislation
followed; those statutes are widely hailed as the last significant environmental
legislation to emerge from the United States’ federal government.177 And just four
years after that, midterm elections handed both congressional chambers to a cohort
170

Telephone Interview with Retired Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept.12, 2014).
See id. In response to a question about how stream mitigation was done two decades
ago, he said, “we probably accepted wetland restoration or enhancement.” When I followed
up by mentioning that other staff had told me that no mitigation was required at all, he said,
“That’s quite possible as well. . . .” Id.
172
See id. (“[Q]uite frankly, we probably didn’t have the technical expertise back in the
early nineties to say to somebody, ‘here is what we want you to do in this channel to make it
better.’ We just didn’t know.”); Telephone Interview with Retired N.C. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality Emp. (Sept. 9, 2015) (noting that state and federal regulatory documents were
ambiguous in their treatment of stream impacts).
173
See Telephone Interview with Senior Corps Staff Members (Nov. 17, 2014) (“For a
long time 404 was viewed as a ‘wetland protection program.’”).
174
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
175
Clean AirAct, Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified
at various portions of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671q (West 2016)).
176
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (amending multiple
parts of the U.S. Code).
177
See RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–26 (2004).
The most prominent exception to this generalization is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, which became much more environmentally protective
through amendments in 1996 and in 2007. See PEW CHARITABLE TR. & OCEAN
CONSERVANCY, THE LAW THAT’S SAVING AMERICAN FISHERIES: THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 12 (2013) (summarizing changes to the
statute).
171
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of conservative Republicans, many of whom were fixated on rolling back
environmental laws.178 Environmental law’s era of trench warfare had begun, and
some of that warfare clearly continues to the present day. But the late 1990s also
brought the beginning of another change, and eventually, it would lead to a
transformation—which is still ongoing—in the legal regime for stream protection.
1. Changing Permit Thresholds
Though that transformation was significant, it has manifested itself in ways that
might initially seem mundane. There was no major new statute, nor any grand
presidential proclamation that led to the shift toward stream protections. Though the
courts have been involved, their role—outside of the central Appalachian coalfields,
which I discuss below in more depth—also has been minor.179 Instead, the heart of
the transformation has been a shift toward increasingly protective permitting
thresholds for stream impacts. Many regulatory systems have thresholds below
which no regulatory constraint exists, and they also often have a second, and higher,
set of thresholds below which regulatory processes exist but are streamlined.180 For
streams, both of these thresholds have been getting lower and lower.
The most salient indicator of this trend is the evolution of the Army Corps’s
nationwide general permits. These permits provide standardized conditions under
which large numbers of projects can be approved.181 And while general permits in
theory should cover only projects that have minimal environmental consequences,182
tens of thousands of projects proceed under general permits every year,183 and the
collective environmental effects of at least some of those projects can be
substantial.184 The economics of general permits are also important. They are faster
178

See LAZARUS, supra note 177, at 128–29.
See infra notes 200–219 and accompanying text (discussing coal cases). My research
assistants and I ran multiple searches for cases involving stream protection and found few
cases that did not involve either coal mining or jurisdictional determinations.
180
See Owen, supra note 142, at 189–90 (discussing the prevalence of these thresholds
and the challenges associated with setting them).
181
See Owen, supra note 13, at 82. For broad discussion of the distinctions between
individual and general permits, see Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The
Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133,
155–64 (2014).
182
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(e)(1) (West 2016) (allowing nationwide permits “if the
Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only
minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”).
183
See RYAN W. TAYLOR, FEDERALISM OF WETLANDS 88, 94 (2013) (finding that the
Corps issued over eighty-five thousand permits per year, and that 95% of them were general
permits).
184
See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,557–59 (documenting massive impacts
from mountaintop removal mining). In comments on a draft of this paper, Corps staff noted
their agency’s disagreement with a claim that the nationwide permits authorize significant
environmental impacts. I am in no position to contest their position with respect to the full
179
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and cheaper to obtain than individual permits, and regulated entities therefore
usually prefer to use general permits.185 For all of these reasons, the thresholds for
these permits are quite important. And in multiple ways, those thresholds have
become more protective.186 The changes have affected all types of aquatic resources,
but they have been particularly pronounced for streams.
As late as the mid-1990s, Nationwide Permit 26 still was the most important
permit for stream fills, and it still was quite permissive. Until 1996, a permittee could
fill ten acres of wetlands or small streams under the permit, and could fill one acre
without even providing any advance notice.187 As a practical matter, that meant
permittees could fill particularly small streams nearly at will; if a stream averages
eight feet wide, one could fill 5,445 feet—more than a mile—without hitting even
that one-acre notice threshold.188 But in 1996, in response to widespread criticism
and litigation, the Corps lowered the permit eligibility limit to five hundred linear
feet, and the agency also began a process of phasing Nationwide Permit 26 out
entirely.189 In 2000, several activity-specific permits replaced Nationwide Permit 26,
and each had a three-hundred-foot linear limit.190 In 2002, the Corps softened that
limit by giving district engineers the ability to waive the three-hundred-foot
threshold.191 But in 2007, the limits again grew tighter. This time the Corps
specifically included ephemeral streams—not just perennial and intermittent—in the

suite of nationwide permits, but I do think the evidence is quite compelling that Nationwide
Permits 21 and 26 did authorize environmental impacts that by any reasonable definition
were substantial and significant. See id.; supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text
(describing activities authorized under Nationwide Permit 26).
185
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (citing costs, which also
have large disparities); CLAUDIA COPELAND, THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE
PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2012) (citing substantial
differences in processing times).
186
Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18 (“There has been a trend toward applying
NWPs to ever-smaller impacts.”).
187
Final Rule for Nationwide Permit Program Regulations and Issue, Reissue, and
Modify, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,110, 59,113–14, 59,125–26, 59,143 (Nov. 22, 1991) (to be codified
at 33 C.F.R. pt. 330) (explaining the thresholds for protection).
188
An acre is 43,560 square feet, and 43,560 divided by eight is 5,445.
189
See Final Notice of Issuance, Reissuance, and Modification of Nationwide Permits,
61 Fed. Reg. 65,874 (Dec. 13,1996); COPELAND, supra note 185, at 4 (describing Nationwide
Permit 26’s slow demise); On Firm Ground, THE AMICUS JOURNAL, Sept. 30, 2000, at 43
(describing the role of litigation in Nationwide Permit 26’s demise).
190
See Final Notice and Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818, 12,889
(Mar. 9, 2000).
191
See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2058–59 (Jan. 15,
2002) (explaining the change).
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three-hundred-foot limit, and it required pre-constructive notification for all uses of
stream fill permits.192 Finally, in 2012, the Corps added requirements for interagency
coordination prior to any waiver of the three-hundred-foot limit.193
A simple hypothetical illustrates the importance of those changes. Suppose a
developer wanted to build a shopping mall. Under the initial site plan, two hundred
linear feet of perennial and intermittent streams (all with average annual flows below
5 cubic feet per second) would be filled, along with an additional four hundred feet
of ephemeral streams. In 1991, the whole project could have proceeded without the
developer even providing preconstruction notification to the Corps.194 But by the
late 2000s, the developer would no longer even be eligible (absent a written waiver)
for a general permit.195 Instead, it would need to obtain an individual permit, which
would mean not only a higher level of scrutiny under Clean Water Act sections
401196 and 404, but also individualized review under the National Environmental
Policy Act and, if threatened or endangered species are present, the Endangered
Species Act.197 What once was a minimal regulatory process could now be quite
rigorous. The developer might still proceed with the project, but it also might give
serious thought to alternative project locations or site designs that would avoid, or
at least reduce, stream fills.198
192

Reissuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092, 11,097 (Mar. 12,

2007)

193

See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,189 (Feb. 21, 2012).
See Final Rule for Nationwide Permit Program Regulations and Issue, Reissue, and
Modify, 56 Fed. Reg. 59,110, 59,113–14, 59,125–26, 59,143 (Nov. 22, 1991) (explaining
the thresholds for protection).
195
See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2058–59 (Jan. 15,
2002) (describing reasons for the waiver requirement).
196
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2016). Section 401 requires federal permit recipients
whose projects involve a discharge to obtain a state certification that their activities will
comply with state water quality standards. In other words, it gives states authority to deny
authorization to, or impose conditions on, federal permits, including 404 permits. Id.
197
See 42 U.S.C.A. §4332(C) (West 2016) (requiring environmental impact statements
for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . .”);
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (West 2016) (requiring interagency consultation for federal agency
actions that might adversely affect threatened or endangered species). The Corps also
consults and completes NEPA compliance for general permits, but it does so on a
programmatic basis rather than for each permit issued. See, e.g., NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT SECTION 7 CONSULTATION BIOLOGICAL OPINION AND
CONFERENCE BIOLOGICAL OPINION 2 (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals
/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP404_BiOp_11-24-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/92J4-GGH2]
(assessing “a national program of categories of activities” rather than “individual discharges
authorized by one or more of these permits”). This saves individual recipients of general
permits from needing to go through project-specific NEPA and ESA compliance—unless
they also need a discretionary federal permit from another agency.
198
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT NATIONWIDE PERMIT 39,
7, 23 (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NW
P_39_2012.pdf, [https://perma.cc/K97R-PLCV] (explaining these incentives); Biber &
Ruhl, supra note 181, at 182–183 (discussing the incentives created by permitting
194
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Table 2: Evolution of Permitting Requirements for Large-Scale Residential or
Commercial Developments199
1991

1996

Impact level
requiring
individual
permits

10
acres

500
ft.

Impact level
requiring
preconstruction
notification

1
acre

1/3
acre

2000

2002

2007

2012

300 ft.

300 ft.
(waiveable)

1/10 acre
or
discharge
to open
water

1/10 acre
or
discharge
to open
water

300 ft.
(waiveable)
Includes
ephemeral
streams
All projects

300 ft.
(waiveable)
Includes
ephemeral
streams
All projects

2. Mountaintop Removal
The evolution of development permits has many parallels,200 but for one type
of stream impact, the changes have come later, more fitfully, and with much more
conflict. For stream fills associated with surface coal mining, the regulatory
evolution is sufficiently distinctive that it merits its own discussion.201
The central Appalachians are rich in streams, aquatic biodiversity, and coal.202
Miners have dug that coal for many years, and by the early 1990s, much of the
readily accessible coal had been extracted, hauled away, and burned.203 To get at
what remained, coal mining companies turned to mountaintop removal, which
involves taking off mountaintops, extracting the coal beneath, recreating an
imitation mountaintop with some of the removed rock, and depositing the leftover
rubble in nearby headwater stream valleys.204 The effects upon streams were
devastating.205
thresholds).
199
I compiled this table by reviewing permitting requirements established in Federal
Register documents for each of the listed years.
200
See Hough & Robertson, supra note 151, at 18 (“There has been a trend toward
applying NWPs to ever-smaller impacts.”).
201
For a more detailed discussion of this evolution, see COPELAND, supra note 88.
202
The central Appalachians are not the only coal-producing region in the country, nor
are they the most important one. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions:
Which States Produce the Most Coal?, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id
=69&t=2 [https://perma.cc/FT6C-4CGJ] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) (showing Wyoming in
the lead, by a huge margin). But since the Appalachian states have been the center of conflicts
between coal production and stream protection, and therefore are also the focus of this
discussion.
203
See COPELAND, supra note 88, at 1.
204
Id.
205
See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of
Mountaintop Mining Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Systems of the Central
Appalachians, ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., Mar. 2011, at 39, 44–49.
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For years, the Corps and its fellow regulatory agencies did little to restrain the
practice. Instead, the Corps routinely authorized stream fills under Nationwide
Permit 21, which covered coal mines that were also regulated under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.206 Nationwide Permit 21 imposed only
modest controls and had no upper threshold. Environmental groups argued—among
other claims—that the Corps’s permits for valley fills were inconsistent with the
Clean Water Act.207 District courts agreed, first with this argument and then with a
series of others, and the groups won a succession of major litigation victories—only
to see the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set one decision after another
aside.208 As late as 2008, mountaintop removals continued with little regulatory
restraint, offset only by weak attempts at compensatory mitigation.209
Yet even in the coalfields, the law of little streams is changing. As soon as it
assumed office in 2009, the Obama Administration began reviewing both individual
permits and broader practices.210 The EPA, the Corps, and the Office of Surface
Mining announced that they would develop new policies for reviewing coal mining
permits.211 General permits changed; the Corps first suspended Nationwide Permit
21 for the six Appalachian coal-mining states, and then, when it reauthorized the
permit, excluded valley fills from its coverage and added acreage and linear foot
limitations.212 The EPA published new guidance designed to establish stricter
environmental performance standards for mining-related permits, with the intended

206

See Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2081 (Jan. 15, 2002)
(describing Nationwide Permit 21).
207
See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(e)(1) (West 2016) (authorizing general permits only if the
permitted activities “are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental
effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on
the environment”).
208
See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607,
614 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) (issuing an injunction), rev’d, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma
Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2009); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 410 F.
Supp. 2d 450, 470–71 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (enjoining the use of Nationwide Permit 21 in West
Virginia), vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 2005); Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 946–47 (S.D.W. Va. 2002)
(issuing an injunction), vacated, 317 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2003); Bragg v. Robertson, 72
F. Supp. 2d 642, 664 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (issuing a permanent injunction), vacated, Bragg v.
W. Va. Coal Mining Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001). In 2009, the plaintiffs finally
won a victory in district court that was not reversed. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604
F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D.W. Va. 2009).
209
See Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,558.
210
COPELAND, supra note 88, at 8–9.
211
See Press Release, EPA, Obama Administration Takes Unprecedented Steps to
Reduce Environmental Impacts of Mountaintop Coal Mining, Announces Interagency
Action Plan to Implement Reforms (June 11, 2009), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress
.nsf/3881d73f4d4aaa0b85257359003f5348/e7d3e5608bba2651852575d200590f23!OpenD
ocument [https://perma.cc/9PYC-HRUK].
212
COPELAND, supra note 88, at 11.
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secondary consequence of limiting, if not entirely ending, valley fills.213 The EPA
also actually vetoed one of the Corps’s individual permits for a major mountaintop
removal mining project.214 Finally, and most recently, the Department of the Interior
joined the reform movement by proposing new rules for protecting streams from
surface mining.215 These administrative actions provoked more litigation,216 and
again the plaintiffs—this time representing industry—succeeded before district
courts, only to lose on appeal.217 So far the transition has not left anyone entirely
satisfied. Environmental groups would prefer even stricter controls, while the
industry decries the initiatives as part of the Obama Administration’s “war on
coal.”218 But whether environmental protection of Appalachian coal country streams
has evolved too much or too little, there is no doubt that it has changed.219
These changes, like the changes to general permits for developments and other
activities, may sound technical. But permits, though somewhat arcane, are the key
213

See COPELAND, supra note 88, at 12; Memorandum from Peter S. Silva & Cynthia
Giles to Shawn Garvin, Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, & Susan Hedman, Improving EPA
Review of Surface Coal Mining Operations Under the Clean Water Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive Order (July 11, 2011)
(on file with author).
214
U.S. EPA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: SPRUCE MINE FINAL DETERMINATION,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/final_spruce_404c_qa_01
1311.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDJ2-8GX5] (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). However, such vetoes
are rare. See Michael C. Blumm & Elisabeth Mering, Vetoing Wetland Permits Under
Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act: A History of Inter-Federal Agency Controversy and
Reform, 33 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 222–23 (2015) (noting that this veto authority
has been used only thirteen times).
215
Stream Protection Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,436, 44,439 (proposed July 27, 2015).
216
As of this writing, the DOI Stream Protection Rule is not yet final, but political
reactions suggest that when it is finalized, lawsuits will follow.
217
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d,
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (considering the EPA’s
2011 guidance); Mingo Logan Coal Co. Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F. Supp. 2d
133, 153 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d, 714 F.3d 608, 609–11 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering the
Spruce Mine permit veto).
218
Nicholas Fandos, U.S. Proposes New Rules to Protect Streams from Coal Pollution,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/us/us-proposes-newrules-to-protect-streams-from-coal-pollution.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z6RY-QEX6].
219
One longtime Corps staff member, in responding to my question about what changes
she had seen during her career, summarized this transition:
Major environmental changes as protecting the environment. And if you said that
to environmental groups they’d probably laugh but they don’t have the
perspective of what the program was before all this started. I mean we are making
a big difference in the areas when coal mining permits are issued in what goes
back and what’s required and what’s being mitigated. None of that was being done
before. . . .
Telephone Interview with Army Corps Dist. Chief (Sept. 16, 2014).
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mechanism through which broad statutory and regulatory mandates become specific,
binding constraints.220 A change in permit coverage or terms therefore can be a very
important shift. And with this particular set of changes, an enormous set of aquatic
resources that once lacked meaningful regulatory protection now cannot be impacted
without a permitting process. In the past few decades, water quality law has seen
few, if any, changes that are more significant.
3. The Emergence of Stream Compensatory Mitigation
These expansions in the scope of the permitting program will have only limited
effects if the permits simply rubber stamp stream fills, as many permits once did.
But stream protection has evolved in other important ways as well: permit
requirements now are changing along with permit thresholds. One of the most
important—and still ongoing—changes involves the emergence of compensatory
mitigation requirements for stream impacts.
(a) The Prevalence of the Practice
Even in the early 1990s, when compensatory mitigation for wetland impacts
was becoming a standard practice, “that’s all that Corps of Engineers districts were
mitigating,” as one retired district chief explained it.221 Impacts to streams were still
occurring, and occurring on a widespread basis, but no one was attempting to
compensate for those impacts by restoring or protecting streams somewhere else.
Beginning in the late 1990s, however, that began to change.
The change started humbly. In the mid-1990s, developers proposed to build
Hanes Mall Boulevard, a commercial project in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.222
Construction would necessitate placing a long length of stream in a culvert, and
North Carolina state regulators were concerned about the impacts.223 But
Nationwide Permit 26 established no constraint on the destruction of the stream, and
the regulators saw little basis for restraint in existing state rules.224 Nor did regulators
have clear ideas about how they might respond. “We knew we wanted to regulate
streams,” one retired state employee told me, “but didn’t know how to do it.”225
Even if regulators were unsure of their next step, a variety of factors were
pushing toward the emergence of compensatory stream mitigation—and made North
Carolina a particularly promising place for the new practice to emerge. Protecting
water quality was, at the time, a salient political issue; a series of massive pollution
spills and fish kills had spurred widespread and bipartisan interest in improving
protection of the state’s waterways.226 The legislature and governor—the latter a
220

See Biber & Ruhl, supra note 181, at 155–56; Owen, supra note 13, at 99.
Telephone Interview with Retired Army Corps Dist. Chief (Sept. 9, 2014).
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Telephone Interview with N.C. State Univ. Scientists (Sept. 4, 2015).
221
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Democrat, and the former containing a Democratic majority—were generally
sympathetic to that public preference.227 But North Carolina also was in the midst of
a real estate development boom, and few politicians or regulators wish to stand
squarely in the way of economic growth.228 So some compromise was necessary. At
a deeper level, the ideologies of environmental lawmaking were shifting, and
regulatory approaches that leaned on market-like systems and private-sector actors
were increasingly popular, even among environmental groups.229 In that political
context, compensatory mitigation could offer something to everyone: environmental
advocates got some preservation and restoration, developers got flexibility, and
regulators could plausibly claim to be doing something other than resorting to
traditional command-and-control regulation. It also did not hurt that North Carolina
already had a robust wetland mitigation banking industry.230 Streams, then, could be
a new frontier for an already-established business model.
And so, the answer North Carolina regulators turned to was a compensatory
mitigation requirement for streams. Using its authority under Clean Water Act
section 401,231 North Carolina began requiring compensatory mitigation for any
stream impacts over one hundred fifty feet in length.232 State regulators also learned
that scientists at North Carolina State University, and also private-sector consultants,
had begun developing new stream restoration techniques, and they used the
emerging science to guide mitigation projects.233 The scientists, in turn, bolstered
the state regulators’ positions by making the case that streams were worth protecting,
and by arguing that compensatory mitigation was a possible way to provide that
protection. Indeed, even years later, a leading EPA section 404 specialist
emphasized to me the importance of “active academic communities educating us on
the importance of streams.”234 Initially, the EPA was mildly supportive and the
Corps, as the former North Carolina state employee described it, was “kind of
227

Id.
See BROOKINGS INST., CTR. ON URBAN AND METRO. POL’Y, ADDING IT UP: GROWTH
TRENDS AND POLICIES IN NORTH CAROLINA 11 (2000) (“North Carolina is developing
phenomenal amounts of land.”).
229
See Rebecca Lave, Neoliberal Confluences: The Turbulent Evolution of Stream
Mitigation Banking in the US, in FIELDS OF KNOWLEDGE: SCIENCE, POLITICS AND PUBLICS
IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY, VOLUME 27, 69–75
(David J. Hess & Scott Frickel eds., 2014).
230
Id. at 78 (describing the wetland mitigation banking industry and its ties to
Congress).
231
33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2016) (requiring state water quality certifications for
federally-authorized projects that will discharge into waters of the United States). For
discussion of how section 401 provides states with leverage over projects subject to the Corps
permitting, see Owen, supra note 13, at 113–16.
232
Hill et al., supra note 166, at 1078.
233
Telephone Interview with Barbara Doll, Ph.D., P.E., Water Prot. & Restoration
Specialist, Sea Grant N.C., N.C. State Univ., & Karen Hall, Ph.D., Extension Assistant
Professor, Biological and Agric. Eng’g, N.C. State Univ. (Sept. 4, 2015).
234
Telephone Interview with EPA staff members (Aug. 21, 2015) (emphasizing the role
of “active academic communities educating us on the importance of streams”).
228
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bemused.”235 But soon they came on board—legally, they had little choice—and
stream mitigation became a more common practice.236
It also spread beyond state boundaries. The mechanisms of that spread defy any
simple summary; indeed, many of the Corps staff I spoke to were not entirely sure
how stream mitigation went from a localized practice to a nationwide priority.237
One academic study attributes the shift partly to the ideas (and seminars) of a few
charismatic consultants, though the staff I spoke with did not emphasize that part of
the story.238 The anecdotes they related instead suggested a process in which
different Corps districts and states learned about stream mitigation through a
gradual, largely uncoordinated process of interjurisdictional communication and
imitation. But however that evolution occurred, some basic numbers illustrate the
magnitude of the resulting changes. Even in North Carolina, a 2005 retrospective
study of stream mitigation projects could find few pre-1999 projects to evaluate.239
But by 2011, two hundred forty stream mitigation banks were in operation.240 The
banks are concentrated in the southeastern United States, where stream mitigation
originated and remains most prevalent, and there are other regions where the practice
is still “in its infancy,” as one Corps staff member put it.241 But stream mitigation is
by no means an exclusively southeastern phenomenon.242
235

Telephone Interview with Retired N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality Emp. (Sept. 9, 2015).
He summarized the Corps’s initial attitude as, “that’s interesting; we don’t know what you’re
trying to do, but, okay. . . .” Id. Environmental groups and other state wetland regulators, he
said, were similarly puzzled at first. Id.
236
See Owen, supra note 13, at 104–05 (summarizing this evolution).
237
See, e,g., Telephone Interview with Army Corps Headquarters Staff (Nov. 17, 2014).
As one staff member explained to me:
I don’t know that there is one, like, defining moment when the light bulb popped
on and everybody said, man we need to start worrying about mitigating for
streams. If you haven’t found it in your interviews I guess I would not be surprised
that no one can really point you to a new focus or a new emphasis on the part of
the Corps or anything that says, hey look, today we are really going to get serious
about stream mitigation and everybody needs to start doing stream mitigation.
Id.

238

See Lave, supra note 229, at 83; see also David Malakoff, The River Doctor, 305
SCI. 937, 939 (2004) (describing the influence of Dave Rosgen, a prominent and
controversial stream restoration scientist).
239
Hill et al., supra note 166, at 1078.
240
Martin W. Doyle & F. Douglas Shields, Compensatory Mitigation for Streams
Under the Clean Water Act: Reassessing Science and Redirecting Policy, 48 J. AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASS’N 494, 495 (2012).
241
Telephone Interview with Senior Corps Staff Member (Nov. 24, 2014) (describing
New York and New England). “I think,” he added, “it kind of parallels the existence of banks,
which [are] much more prevalent further south. . . .” Id.
242
In-lieu, fee programs also fund stream restoration work, so my focus on mitigation
banking credits almost certainly understates the full extent of the practice.

2017]

LITTLE STREAMS AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATIONS

37

Figure 1: States Where Stream Mitigation Credits Were Available for Purchase,
August 11–12, 2015243

The practice also enjoyed increasing support from the Corps and the EPA
headquarters. In 2002, the Corps’s headquarters issued a “regulatory guidance
letter,” which specifically stated that no net loss should be a guiding principle for all
aquatic resources, not just wetlands.244 And in a 2008 rulemaking, the Corps and the
EPA provided further support for the emerging practice.245 The primary purpose of
the 2008 rulemaking was to set new rules for compensatory mitigation, and the
resulting regulations devote page after page to the operation of mitigation banks and
243

Compiled from data on the Corps’s RIBITS database, Aug. 11–12, 2015. These
numbers include only credits that were actually for sale. Other banks had previously sold
credits but had none presently on offer, or were developing credits for future sales. These
numbers also do not include credits allocated to specific species, which is a common practice
on the West Coast.
244
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NO. 02-2. REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER:
GUIDANCE ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION PROJECTS FOR AQUATIC RESOURCE IMPACTS
UNDER THE CORPS REGULATORY PROGRAM PURSUANT TO SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT AND SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT OF 1899 (Dec. 24, 2002)
(“Districts should require compensatory mitigation projects for streams to replace stream
functions where sufficient functional assessments are available. However, where functional
assessment is not practical, mitigation projects for streams should generally replace linear
feet of stream on a one-to-one basis.”); see Mark Sudol, A Note from Headquarters, AQUATIC
RESOURCES NEWS, Spring 2003, at 1, 1 (“Compensatory mitigation has long been associated
with impacts to wetlands however, as stated in RGL 02-02 and the 2002 NWPs, all impacts
to waters of the U.S. should be mitigated.”).
245
Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594
(Apr. 10, 2008).
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in-lieu fee programs.246 But the regulations apply to all waters of the United States,
not just wetlands, and in the preamble, the Corps and the EPA acknowledged that
they had considered, and rejected, arguments against requiring compensatory
mitigation for streams.247 Even after this endorsement, the practice still is not
prevalent in some regions, and the Corps’s nationwide permits still establish a
stronger mandate for wetland mitigation than they do for streams.248 But while steps
still remain, compensatory stream mitigation is becoming an increasingly prevalent
practice—and requirement.249
That requirement is also becoming increasingly standardized and rigorous. In
the early years of compensatory mitigation, accounting practices were often loose,
and guidance documents explaining how regulators should account for stream
impacts were essentially nonexistent.250 That created problems; valuing stream and
wetland impacts is no simple matter, and if valuation is handled poorly, the
environment often comes out on the losing end of the deal.251 But in the past ten
years, stream mitigation guidance documents have proliferated, and states and the
Corps districts across the country now have guidance documents designed to bring
some standards, rigor, and consistency to their stream mitigation efforts.252 Those
documents also are evolving; some are now in their second or third iterations.253
Substantial room for improvement remains; in my interviews, I never heard anyone
claim to have mastered the art of stream mitigation.254 But the proliferation of
guidance documents indicates, at the very least, that what once was a rare and
geographically limited practice has now gone national and mainstream.
246

Id.
Id. at 19,596–97 (explaining why stream mitigation would be required).
248
See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,285 (Feb. 21, 2012)
(mandating compensatory mitigation for all unavoidable wetland impacts over 1/10 acre in
area, but leaving some stream mitigation requirements to the discretion of district engineers).
In comments on a draft of this paper, Corps staff noted that some Corps districts have
exercised that discretion and now require more stream protections that go beyond the
nationwide permits’ baseline levels.
249
See Lave et al., supra note 23, at 287.
250
I was unable to find any such guidance documents from before 1997.
251
For general discussion of these valuation challenges, see Dave Owen & Colin Apse,
Trading Dams, 48 U.C.D. L. REV. 1043, 1097–99 (2014); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 622–30
(2000).
252
See ASS’N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, Stream Mitigation Guidance,
Procedures, Handbooks and Protocols, ASWM.ORG, http://www.aswm.org/wetlandprograms?catid=0&id=4878 [https://perma.cc/PZZ6-T7TY] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016)
(listing and providing links to guidance documents).
253
See Lave, supra note 229, at 77 (“Every regulatory jurisdiction in which I conducted
interviews had either gone through a major revision of their stream mitigation guidelines in
the previous three years to address concerns [about the effectiveness of earlier guidelines] or
was in the process of doing so.”).
254
See Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 12, 2014) (“[I]t’s an
evolving science, very evolving.”).
247
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Figure 2: States Where Compensatory Stream Mitigation Guidance Exists255

255

Readers should also be aware of a few caveats about these maps. First, I compiled
the chart by searching the Internet for guidance documents, and it is possible that some early
guidance documents have vanished from the Internet and have not been cited elsewhere.
Second, deciding what counts as a stream mitigation guidance document involves some
judgment calls. Some documents address streams fairly briefly, while others cover them in
elaborate detail, and another reviewer might draw the lines at a slightly different point. Third,
the chart may understate the extent to which guidance is used, for some states and Corps
districts are probably using guidance from other areas. Fourth and finally, some guidance
documents are specific to regions—like an individual Corps district—whose boundaries do
not align exactly with those of the states.
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D. Unfinished Work
Because of all these changes, little streams have more legal protection now than
they did fifteen years ago. More streams fall within the scope of regulatory coverage;
the regulatory requirements protecting those streams are more rigorous; and those
requirements also are becoming increasingly sophisticated. But that does not mean
those streams, or the downstream waters that depend upon them, receive stringent
levels of protection. There are two primary reasons why. First, the 404 program
increasingly relies upon compensatory mitigation, and vigorous debates continue
about how, and even whether, compensatory mitigation can be done well.256 The
second reason is the 404 program’s narrow bounds. Ultimately, protecting streams
requires protecting the landscapes from which they flow, and the 404 program, with
its focus on direct filling of aquatic features, can reach those landscapes only to a
limited extent.257
1. Mitigation Troubles
Scientists who have studied stream mitigation generally have no objection to
the increased scope of regulatory protection. Indeed, much of the scientific literature
produced in the last eight years reads like a massive amicus brief, all designed to
convince Justice Kennedy, who will likely cast the deciding vote in any future
Supreme Court case on Clean Water Act jurisdiction, that a significant nexus really
does connect small streams to downstream waters.258 But multiple studies have
expressed concern about how effective mitigation practices actually are.
The harshest assessments come from studies of Appalachian coal country. In
2014, Margaret Palmer, a leading stream scientist, and Kelly Hondula reviewed data
from dozens of mitigation sites in the southern Appalachians.259 By the measured
standards of scientific prose, their assessment fairly seethes with outrage:
[T]he assessment criteria and requirements for compliance in the projects
reviewed do not meet basic scientific standards: they do not take
measurements relevant to the factors of interest, they have conclusions
inconsistent with the data, and are overall inadequate to assess the
256

Some of the most damning critiques are now aging. See, e.g., COMM. ON MITIGATING
WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 165, at 138–40. However, recent studies—particularly those
focused on stream mitigation—have found plenty of continuing problems. E.g., Doyle &
Shields, supra note 240, at 500; Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,554–58.
257
See Margaret A. Palmer & J. David Allan, Restoring Rivers, 22 ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH. 40, 42 (2006) (“The primary reason why so many rivers and streams are still being
degraded today is poor land stewardship.”).
258
See, e.g., Alexander et al., supra note 46, at 56 (“The results also provide scientific
information that potentially broadens understanding of the extent of Federal CWA
jurisdiction in waters of the United States, a topic of continuing importance as illustrated by
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases.”).
259
Palmer & Hondula, supra note 27, at 10,552.
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outcomes required by the [Clean Water Act] . . . . There is no evidence
that mitigation is meeting the objectives of the [Clean Water Act] and
looking forward there is no reason to believe this will change unless new
mitigation requirements and scientifically rigorous assessments are put in
place.260
In a broader synthesis paper published a few years earlier, Martin Doyle and F.
Douglas Shields reached only slightly less damning conclusions. “The balance of
published evidence,” they concluded, “suggests that current practices of stream
restoration . . . cannot be assumed to provide demonstrable physical, chemical, or
biological functional improvements.”261 Neither set of authors declared that effective
compensatory mitigation for streams is an impossibility, and Doyle and Shields
identified alternative ways by which mitigation practices might be improved.262 But
they agreed, emphatically, that present practices were inadequate.
Those analyses might lead one to think that all the changes described in this
Part have been for naught—that the Corps has simply come up with fancier
regulatory mechanisms to paper over the same old environmentally destructive
practices. And that conclusion would be consistent with much of the legal-academic
literature on compensatory mitigation, some of which decries the practice as a sham,
“a myth,” or, at worst, a practice that actually enables environmental destruction.263
But before drawing that conclusion, it is important to consider two mitigating facts
about stream mitigation.
The first is that stream mitigation practices are not a replacement for policies
that forbade stream impacts. Many legal critiques of compensatory mitigation
implicitly assume that if compensatory mitigation were not available, projects would
simply be stopped.264 That assumption is questionable. Political support for
environmental regulations that simply block development exists only in rare
circumstances; as one veteran regulator explained to me, “there is no stopping
things, with very, very, very limited exceptions.”265 Instead, at worst, we have traded
a circumstance in which stream impacts occur and are not mitigated at all for one in
260

Id. at 10,558.
Doyle & Shields, supra note 240, at 500.
262
Id. at 7–13.
263
See Al Lin, Myths of Environmental Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 47–50, 62; Susan
Walker et al., Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 149, 152 (2009).
264
See, e.g., Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting,
46 AKRON L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2013) (“Mitigation banks have enabled the conversion of
thousands of acres of wetlands and endangered species habitats, facilitating development of
those lands.”); Nat Gillespie, Stream Mitigation Banking, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE,
http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/articles/stream-mitigation-banking/
[https://perma.cc/DT7H-DPUQ] (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) (describing environmentalists’
fears).
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which those impacts occur and are partially mitigated.266 Partial mitigation may
sound disappointing, and it may fall short of what the Clean Water Act and its
implementing regulations seem to require, but it is usually better than nothing.
Second, sometimes merely requiring that a practice be done at all is a necessary
predicate to requiring that it be done well. Indeed, that was exactly the rationale of
the North Carolina agency staff who first pushed the practice: they knew present
stream valuation and restoration practices stood on weak scientific footing, but they
thought the most effective way to generate more science—and better stream
protection—was to create a regulatory need for that science. “If you build the rules,”
one staff member explained, “the science will come.”267 Environmental lawyers tend
to think of environmental law as a field spurred by scientific advances, and
sometimes it is.268 But sometimes the causal relationships work the other way
around, and stream mitigation exemplifies that alternative dynamic.269
And the science is coming along. Much of the research discussed in Part I of
this Article is fairly recent, and the volume of stream-related research has increased
greatly in recent decades. Restoration science also is evolving; even critics of
existing practices have also offered ideas about how stream restoration might be
done better.270 And the Corps and the EPA have been receptive to those new ideas.
In interviews, agency staff readily acknowledged that they still have much to learn
about stream mitigation, and that their practices are continuing to evolve, but they
also spoke of their commitment to making those improvements.271 To provide one
example of that evolution, regulators have published guidance on using ecological
functions, rather than linear feet or simple measures of physical morphology, as the
266

The existence of a mitigation requirement also creates an economic incentive to
avoid stream impacts (and thus avoid the cost of mitigation), and that incentive exists
whether or not the mitigation is done well.
267
Telephone Interview with retired N.C. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality Emp. (Sept. 9, 2015).
He readily acknowledged that the policy had gotten out in front of the science; stream
mitigation, in his view, was “more driven by policy than by science. . . . The science kind of
caught up. . . . We saw a policy need and we did it.” Id.
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See James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 907–
10 (2005).
269
Perhaps the most prominent recent example of this phenomenon is the way Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard in Rapanos v. United States has catalyzed scientific
research on what constitute a significant nexus and where such connections exist. 547 U.S.
715, 726 (2006). See, e.g., Alexander et al., supra note 46; Freeman et al., supra note 55. But
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field. See, e.g., Sanne Knudsen, Adversarial Science, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2014)
(describing how legal requirements have spurred research on long-term ecosystem damage
from oil spills); Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011) (describing the role of law in generating a
common medical diagnosis).
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See, e.g., Doyle & Shields, supra note 240, at 500–04.
271
See Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Sept. 12, 2014) (“[W]hat we
did back in 1999 we probably wouldn’t do today.”).
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currency for compensatory stream mitigation.272 If widely adopted, that alternative
currency would create an incentive for restoring streams so they actually work like
natural streams, rather than merely looking like natural streams.273 Similarly,
regulators are also allowing experimentation with alternative methods of stream
restoration, like dam removal, that hold more promise than simply using bulldozers
to reshape a stream channel.274 These initiatives underscore a broader point.
Environmental restoration is complicated, difficult work, and it takes learning and
experimentation to do it well. With stream mitigation, that learning process has just
begun.
Of course, it is one thing to identify some learning improvement and another to
say that substantial progress has been made, or will continue to occur. On the former
front, the debates still are vigorous.275 On the latter, there are no guarantees.
Effective compensatory mitigation practices require sustained and effective
government oversight.276 And, as the opposition to the Clean Water Rule indicates,
the very idea of government regulation remains under attack, particularly in the
stream mitigation heartland of the southeast.277 In one possible future, regulatory
agencies and environmental advocates—and, perhaps, mitigation bankers, whose
business model depends upon credible regulators—will keep regulatory oversight in
place.278 But in another plausible future, scientists and some regulators will develop
an increasingly sophisticated understanding of good stream mitigation practices,
only to see regulators lose the will, or the capacity, to put those practices into effect.
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See Lave et al., supra note 23, at 288 (“[T]he tacit assumption that a quantity of
linear stream assessed solely for morphology can provide a consistent quantity of stream
function is deeply problematic.”).
274
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See Lave, supra note 229, at 76 (summarizing critiques of some early stream
assessment methodologies).
276
See Robert L. Glicksman, Regulatory Safeguards for Accountable Ecosystem
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2. Beyond the Stream Channel
In a second way, the changes described above are an incomplete story. With
limited exceptions, the legal reforms have focused on streams rather than
surrounding landscapes. The combination of Clean Water Act sections 301 and 404
prohibits unpermitted discharges of dredged or fill material to streams, and to other
waters of the United States, and that is all.279 Those sections do not prohibit
developing nonwetland riparian areas adjacent to streams.280 Nor do they prohibit
building parking lots and roofs throughout a watershed, and thus altering flow
patterns until streams are overloaded with flood flows and pollutants.281 Nor do those
sections prohibit groundwater pumping that drains streams dry.282 In short, they
protect streams from just one of the many threats that beset them. And that limited
protection, no matter how stringently it is implemented, will often be insufficient to
protect water quality in streams.
In theory, other laws might fill those gaps. Other parts of the Clean Water Act,
and of other federal statutes, can reach where section 404 cannot.283 Similarly, state
and local governments have broad authority to regulate land use practices, and they
could invoke that authority to restrain practices that harm streams.284 Sometimes
they do.285 But in many places, state or local stream protections are weak or
nonexistent, with legislatures and local governments preferring to let the federal
government take the lead.286 And federal assertions of authority are inhibited by the
substantial costs of retrofitting landscapes to protect small streams, and by the everpresent arguments that federal stream protections represent infringements on
traditional state and local land use authority.287 Despite those limitations, the EPA is
279
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See Owen, supra note 85, at 439–45 (describing stressors affecting urban
watersheds).
282
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still trying, in multiple ways, to encourage development and redevelopment patterns
that are more consistent with water quality.288 But some of the boldest regulatory
levers, like a major new stormwater rule, still lie unused.289
For all of these reasons, the evolution of stream law still is a work in progress,
and a work that cannot be completed under section 404 alone. But that should not
detract from the significance of the changes that have already occurred. The United
States has shifted from a legal regime in which protections were nearly nonexistent
to one in which protections are partial but increasingly widespread, and unevenly
effective but improving. In the messy and halting real world of environmental
policymaking, that is a very big deal.
III. LESSONS FROM LITTLE STREAMS
So why does this story matter? The most straightforward answer is that an
ecologically important and geographically pervasive resource now receives more
protection than it once did, and there is room for additional change. That alone
justifies attention to the emergence of stronger regulatory protections for streams.
But the story is also interesting because key elements of it diverge from some of the
darker narratives of present-day environmental law. Not all of the story so diverges,
and perhaps the most important lesson of this whole study is the banal point that
environmental policymaking is messy, complicated, and unpredictable. But those
areas of divergence should provide a reminder that even in times of polarization and
conflict, environmental law can and does evolve, in its fitful, incremental way.
Many of those dark narratives begin with gridlock. Congress, in the standard
telling, cannot agree internally on, or obtain White House support for, meaningful
changes to environmental laws, and statutory environmental law therefore has
changed little—for better or worse—since 1990.290 As many commentators have
noted, that still leaves the possibility of action from agencies and the courts.291 But
the courts do not seem as receptive to far-reaching environmental litigation as they
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might have been in the 1970s or 1980s,292 and administrative law theory provides
many reasons to expect little of agencies. According to various competing theories
of agency behavior, administrative agencies are either captured tools of the
industries they are supposed to regulate293 or single-minded technocrats oblivious to
the collateral costs of the controls they impose.294 It is no surprise, then, that a future
premised on administrative-level reforms strikes many people as a depressing
prospect.
To be fair, not everyone shares these views, and many people who do hold them
would readily acknowledge that there are exceptional circumstances. And this is by
no means the first article to chronicle the alternative pathways through which
environmental law continues to evolve.295 With the recent election, stasis and
gridlock are also beginning to strike many people as a comparatively desirable state
of affairs. But even before the election, the darker stories emerged with striking
frequency, and they contributed to a widespread—and, perhaps, self-fulfilling—
sense of policy malaise. That malaise heightens the importance of reminders,
wherever one may find them, that there are more promising possibilities for
environmental law.
A. Government Agencies as Engines of Reform
One key element of many traditional narratives of environmental law is their
emphasis on actors external to government agencies—and their associated disdain
for the agencies themselves. For environmental advocates, this emphasis is quite old.
Even during the founding era of environmental law, environmentalists and their
allied scholars were centrally focused on identifying legal mechanisms that would
compel recalcitrant government regulators to act, or to stop environmental
destructive agencies from acting. The public trust doctrine, as articulated by Joseph
Sax, and the citizen suit were classic legal responses to this concern.296 The agency,
292
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in this view, might be a necessary vehicle for navigating the road toward
environmental progress, but that vehicle was deeply unreliable.297 Congress,
therefore, would provide a clear map, through the substantive—and highly
specific—mandates of its statutes, and citizen litigation would provide the backup
engine.298
Critics outside the environmental movement often express similar views of
agency dynamics. One of the central tenets of public choice theory—a particularly
influential theory within the field of administrative law—is that agencies function
as rational, self-interested actors as they respond to incentives created by external
actors.299 They act to please powerful interest groups or politicians (whose behavior,
in turn, can be explained by similar rational-actor models), rather than placing their
own distinctive stamp on policymaking.300 Many public choice theorists may
disagree with environmentalists only in their assessment of where environmental
groups sit within this model; they perceive environmental groups as just another
special interest within the public choice model, rather than as an antidote to public
choice dynamics.301 But the premise of agencies as passive policymakers remains
largely the same.302 Only the critics who perceive agencies as single-minded
regulatory zealots seem ready to credit—or, more accurately, curse—the idea that
an agency could be an engine of legal change. But even those critics still often seem
to be describing agencies as somewhat inhuman automatons, eagerly grasping power
but incapable of considered judgment.
There is no question that the public choice models, at least, can explain some
of the actions of environmental regulators. Citizen suits have played vital roles in
the development of environmental law, and other public choice dynamics can help
explain agency priorities and, often, agencies’ reluctance to act.303 More specifically,
capture).
297
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these critiques also can shed light on some aspects of the story of stream regulation,
for interest groups clearly were, and remain, influentially involved.304 But often
these critiques underemphasize the dynamic role played by agency culture and
mission. They underplay, in other words, the reality that agencies often are policy
instigators, not just reactive bodies.
Examples of that affirmative role recur throughout the recent history of stream
regulation. Initially, the Corps provided little protection for streams largely because
many of the engineers and military personnel who dominated the agency genuinely
believed in building things.305 And as the agency’s staffing, culture, and mission
began to reorient around the Clean Water Act’s regulatory mandate—and as the
regulatory program had more people to do its work—so too did the scope of
protections.306 Environmental litigation helped spur that reorientation, as did the
persistent advocacy of partner federal and state agencies.307 But Corps staff also
began providing more protection to streams because providing more protection just
seemed like the appropriate thing to do. Repeatedly, staff told me that leaving
streams out of their protective systems just did not make sense to them, given the
basic mandate of the Clean Water Act and their increasing understanding of the
ecological importance of tributary streams.308 They moved toward protecting
streams, in other words, not—or, at least, not just—to acquiesce to pressure from
environmental groups, but also because they viewed that protection as part of their
agency mission.
The timing of changes in protection also underscores the importance of an
agency’s internal sense of direction. The evolution of modern stream protection
environmental policymaking); Hahn, supra note 299, at 27 (describing how interest group
politics can explain the common practice of grandfathering existing sources).
304
The evolution of regulations protecting streams from coal mining has at times
exemplified this traditional understanding of environmental law, with agency policy driven
in significant part by litigation from environmental groups. See supra note 229 and
accompanying text (describing the role of the mitigation banking industry).
305
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began in earnest during President Bill Clinton’s second term, at a time when the
administration was embracing a variety of environmentally protective initiatives.309
But it continued through the 2000s, when the nation was governed by an
administration whose environmental philosophy was, as one professor aptly put it,
“anything industry wants.”310 During the George W. Bush Administration, the Corps
issued a regulatory guidance letter endorsing requirements for stream mitigation,
lowered thresholds on nationwide permits to include coverage for ephemeral
streams, further endorsed stream mitigation—under more rigorous rules—in the
2008 compensatory mitigation rule, and expanded the practice on the ground.311 The
movement was not entirely one way; the 2002 nationwide permits also added waiver
provisions and did very little to advance regulation of the stream fills associated with
mountaintop removal mining.312 But little streams had more protection at the end of
the Bush Administration than they did at the beginning. And while Congress played
a minor role, much of the change occurred because the Corps and the EPA were
simply taking what they saw as logical next steps toward fulfilling their protective
mission.313
This evolution supports more emphasis on the role of agencies in instigating,
and sustaining, environmental policy reform. Give an agency a mission and a
statutory mandate, and money to hire staff drawn to that mission and mandate, and
it will probably try to turn that mandate into reality. The process may be quite slow,
particularly if it requires changing agency culture, and forces external to the agency
will be important. But those external forces are not the only variables that matter, or
even close to it. Within agencies, the streams story suggests, there can be an evolving
sense of direction and a powerful engine of reform. That engine may run in low gear,
but over time it can transform a regulatory program.
B. Beyond Zero-Sum
Another of the central, and deeply negative, narratives of environmental policy
have become the story of the trenches. The basic idea is that environmentalists and
industry are largely dug in, with agencies stuck in the cross fire in between, and with
neither side able to advance.314 Of course, industry and environmental advocates
309
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often allege that the agency has gone to bed with the opposing army, but the trench
metaphor still holds. And in trench warfare, one side’s advance is necessarily the
other side’s retreat. The game is adversarial and zero-sum.
Clearly, this description sometimes fits quite well. The conflicts between the
coal industry and the Clean Air Act provide perhaps the most salient example; given
its heavy impacts and marginal economics, it is becoming increasingly difficult to
imagine a future in which the coal industry thrives amid meaningful environmental
protections.315 Indeed, the conflicts over protecting streams from mountaintop
removal mining are just one manifestation of this larger dynamic.316 Advances in
protection there have occurred belatedly and litigiously, and the political battles
remain intense.317
But many of the changes in stream protection have not looked like trench
warfare. Initially, the mere fact that so much has changed belies the analogy. In
classic trench warfare, there was not much movement. Also, except for the battles
of valley fills, the changes that have occurred have not been particularly litigious. A
search of Lexis or Westlaw for cases involving stream regulation produces
surprisingly few hits, and the only fact patterns that seem to arise with any
consistency—other than the mountaintop removal cases discussed above—involve
jurisdictional determinations.318 Even those are not particularly plentiful. Many legal
actions never make it into Lexis and Westlaw databases, so these searches were
almost certainly somewhat underinclusive. But even with that caveat, the small
number of cases suggests that until recently, regulated entities have not gotten all
that worked up about the shift.319
Similarly, political responses to the shift toward stream regulation have—at
times—been muted. That certainly is not the case right now; the political response
to the Clean Water Rule has been anything but calm and measured.320 But previous
changes—the incremental decreases in permitting thresholds, the expansion of
compensatory mitigation requirements, and even the 2008 rule that affirmed, on a
nationwide basis, the importance of stream mitigation—provoked little media
coverage or political response.321 Indeed, in the very few media accounts to even
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discuss the 2008 rule, the only criticisms came from environmentalists.322 John
Boehner, it seems, said nothing at all.
Why is that? The obvious answer is that the present critiques fit with the
favorite narrative of a party that was, until recently, in the opposition, and that
narrative would not have worked so well with a Republican sitting in the Oval
Office. But there is an additional possible explanation, which also fits poorly with
the narrative of zero-sum trench warfare: in many circumstances, regulated
industries could accommodate the changes.
If one of the dominant trends of stream and wetlands protection has been
expanding protections, the other key trend has been a move toward more efficient
modes of protection. Even with lowering thresholds, most of the Corps’s permits are
general permits, and general permits issue relatively quickly and cheaply.323 For
even a modest-scale development project, their cost will be a tiny portion of the
overall budget. The emergence of in-lieu fee programs and a sophisticated mitigation
banking industry has also simplified the process of complying with permit terms.324
A builder needs only to persuade a Corps office that impacts are unavoidable, and
that they cannot be further minimized, and then write a check. And the Corps has
also worked on a variety of other mechanisms, from standardized mitigation
agreements to creating consolidated multi-agency permitting processes, all designed
to increase the efficiency of permitting processes.325
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criticism only from the National Wildlife Federation); Susan Palmer, Rules Set Wetlands
Standards, EUGENE REG.-GUARD (March 28, 2006), http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/register
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There will always be outliers who reject the whole process and, if they are
caught, wind up in court.326 But for most of the repeat players who work with the
404 program, stream protection may be an increasingly predictable cost of doing
business. Sometimes it may even wind up being a benefit. If avoiding stream fills
ultimately means that a development does not flood, or if buyers decide they like the
way a little green space looks, protecting streams may ultimately produce positive
economic returns.
C. The Alternative History of Environmental Law
Many environmental lawyers and law teachers—particularly those who
identify with the environmental movement—are drawn to stories of epic battles.
Fights over massive dam proposals or old-growth logging inspire generation after
generation of law students and frame the worldviews of both professors and
practicing attorneys. And those stories often follow a particular trajectory, with
recalcitrant agencies declining, largely because of intense industry pressure, to fulfill
the mandates set forth by the forward-thinking legislators of the 1970s and 1980s.327
Bold lawsuits follow.328 Sometimes the environmentalists win; sometimes they
lose.329 But the roles stay largely constant—unless conservative advocacy groups or
politicians are telling the tales. Then, everything shifts; the villains are
environmental zealots within and outside the halls of the EPA and other federal
agencies, and the righteous victims are the defenders of employment, free enterprise,
and rational thought.330 But within that second set of stories, a similar kind of internal
uniformity persists.
But if the recent history of stream protection is also a microcosm of
environmental law history, then how else might that history be told? We might start
by acknowledging that the legislators of the 1970s and 1980s, for all their foresight,
underestimated the complexities of the tasks they assigned to administrative
regulators. In particular, they underestimated the extent to which environmental
326
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progress would require picky, detailed attention to thousands of small threats.331 The
incremental effects of thousands of little stream fills are just one example of this
phenomenon.332 The Congresses of environmental law’s early years gave regulators
the authority to respond to those problems, but neither they nor the agencies they
empowered had the toolboxes or the experience to undertake the difficult, and
sometimes intrusive, tasks involved in administering this brave new regime.333 What
followed, then, was a long period when the gaps between environmental mandates
and actual practice were extraordinarily large and agencies were not quite sure how
those gaps could be closed—and in which some efforts at closure were both clumsy
and ineffective.334
Things are very different now. The United States may no longer pass significant
environmental statutes; the glory years of environmental legislating are over. But
the other key story of the last thirty years has been the evolution of administrative
protections. Across many different subfields of environmental law, agencies have
moved, slowly and fitfully, toward expanding and improving the protections offered
within existing statutory bounds. Central to that movement has been an increasing
intolerance of harms that might once have been written off as de minimis. The shift
is by no means complete; there are still many gaps between the ambitions of the
statutes of the 1970s and 1980s and the regulatory practices of the present day.335
And figuring out ways to use limited, and often declining, staffing levels and budgets
to regulate increasing numbers of pollution sources remains an enormous challenge
for environmental agencies.336 But from hazardous waste management to stormwater
regulation to stream fills, environmental law is filled with examples of gradually
increasing regulatory protection.337
331
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Regulated industries (and regulated governmental entities and individuals)
have sometimes been an implacable opponent of those changes. But at the same time
agencies have learned to protect more, they also have learned to protect in ways
more solicitous of the regulated, and the regulated have learned to work with the
new regulatory regimes.338 General permits, compensatory mitigation programs, and
more cooperative enforcement regimes, to provide a few examples, have all been
designed to make regulation work better for regulated industries.339 And the growth
of the environmental consulting industry,340 the emergence of private certification
systems,341 and an increasing embrace of environmental management systems and
self-auditing programs,342 to provide a few more examples, have all offered
industries ways to take charge of their own compliance, and to integrate
environmental requirements into functioning business models. Perhaps, then, our
dominant narrative should not be of gridlock. Instead, it might be a story of a process
of mutual accommodation, in which the regulated and the regulators gradually work
toward turning the ambitious but somewhat naïve mandates of the 1970s into
functional realities.
Of course, this alternative story is not independent of the classic narratives of
conflict. Individual players are often playing out both an accommodation and a
confrontation strategy, and outcomes in legislatures and courts inform everyone’s
willingness to negotiate. Sometimes that intertwinement is symbiotic; a lawsuit
often is the jumpstart that kicks more collaborative processes into gear.343 But the
interconnections can also be problematic. In any process of social or regulatory
change, there are players for whom conflict is an end, not just a means; for reasons
of ideology, politics, or professional job security, they perceive accommodation as
a direct threat. Those interrelationships are all the more reason for emphasizing,
particularly in legal thought, the administrative evolution story of environmental
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338
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regulation. By professional disposition, as well as by human nature, lawyers are
often drawn to conflict; it provides our best war stories and generates many of our
billable hours. But there is a very real danger that, in our fixation on the classic
courtroom battles, we will not just miss the quieter evolutionary processes that occur
outside the spotlight. We may fail to nurture them, or even stunt their growth through
our persistent emphasis on conflict.
If that all sounds abstract, consider, for a moment, the current fight over the
Clean Water Rule. Most of the rule’s opponents have cast the rule as a massive
power grab that will devastate key sectors of the American economy.344 While their
arguments are more measured, some environmental groups have argued that the rule
actually relinquishes key protections, with disturbing consequences for water
quality.345 And no doubt many advocates have convinced themselves that these
stories are true, and that they justify the many legal actions against the new rule. But
a more prosaic possibility is that the rule makes slight adjustments to the existing
scope of jurisdiction, and that even before the rule emerged, the Corps and the EPA
were continuing to develop slowly-improving protections for streams and wetlands,
and were offering those protections in ways industries could live with. That story
does not resonate as well with standard narratives of environmental law, and the
Clean Water Rule may well end because judges or legislators or a president believe
that agencies are on the rampage, and that reining them in is the only way to restore
our constitutional balance. But in this circumstance, a more prosaic story just
happens to be accurate.
CONCLUSION
In 1972, Congress passed a statute whose text offered sweeping protection for
waterways across the nation. In theory, those protections extended to little streams.
Actual practices were different, not just in the 1970s but also well into the 1990s.346
But over the past twenty years, small streams have become a central focus of
regulatory protection, with the extent and type of those protections continuing to
evolve to this day, and with additional changes still possible. The future of that
evolution is uncertain, and it may hang in the balance; Congress, the incoming
administration, or the courts could nip much of this progress in the bud. But so long
as it lasts, the story of little streams illustrates the continuing ability of environmental
law to evolve and change, and the incremental—and often unnoticed—ways in
which those changes occur.
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